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Adopting Accountable Care Through the Medicare
Framework
Barbara J. Zabawa, Louise G. Trubek & Felice F. Borisy-Rudin
I.

INTRODUCTION

By enacting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
1
2010 (ACA), Congress provoked change in the status quo in
American health care delivery and payment. Although challenged by
conservative voices resistant to change, the ACA survived its recent
2
constitutional challenge. Regardless of how Congress tries to amend
the ACA in the future, one vestige of the ACA likely to remain at least
in the marketplace, if not in the law, is the concept of accountable
3
care. The ACA created two programs, the Medicare Shared Savings
4
Program (MSSP) and the Pioneer Accountable Care Organization
5
Model (“Pioneer”), which work in parallel to bring the concept of
6
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) to the Medicare program.
At its core, the accountable care model matches payment for care
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1
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
2
Nat’l. Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603, 565 U.S. _____, (June 28,
2012) (upholding the ACA’s individual mandate as constitutional within Congress’s
taxing powers).
3
See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, New Medical Care Networks Show Savings, NY TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/health/policy/medical-carenetworks-show-savings-study-finds.html.
4
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2010).
5
Notice, Medicare Program: Pioneer Accountable Care Organization Model:
Request for Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 29249, 29250 (May 20, 2011).
6
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A).
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7

with performance-based measures. This is a bold move away from
8
current volume-based payment models.
This paper makes the case that the MSSP serves as a suitable
launch pad for the accountable care movement. In Part II, the
Article explores the emergence of accountable care in two states with
9
very different health care markets—Wisconsin and New Jersey.
Contrasting the health care markets of Wisconsin and New Jersey
offers insight into the flexibility of the criteria offered by the MSSP,
which will permit all states to adopt ACO models, regardless of their
political or commercial environments.
In Part III, the Article highlights some skepticism surrounding
ACOs, particularly the fear of a second “managed care backlash” and
the concern about abusive market practices. In particular, some
critics are concerned that under accountable care, providers will
ultimately be forced to compromise quality of care to achieve cost
savings, which may create a consumer backlash similar to the demise
10
of managed care in the 1990s. Others express fear that ACOs will
push provider consolidation, leading to higher health care costs
11
because of more concentrated market power.
Part IV demonstrates how the MSSP addresses the concerns
expressed by skeptics through patient-centered criteria, a legal
roadmap to reduce market abuses, and a multi-tiered governance
structure. The section explores how the creators of the MSSP
learned from the managed care and consumerism movements to
12
improve the chances that ACOs will be sustainable and successful.
The patient-centered criteria are critical starting points for ACO
success. It is helpful to view the MSSP patient-centered criteria
13
through the lens of Albert O. Hirschman’s “exit, voice, and loyalty.”
The authors propose that ACOs will not realize the full financial
7

AM. HOSP. ASS’N, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: AHA RESEARCH
SYNTHESIS REPORT 3 (2010), available at http://www.aha.org/research/cor/content
/aco_cp.pdf [hereinafter AHA RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT].
8
76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67803 (Nov. 2, 2011) (noting that value-based purchasing
is a concept that links payment directly to the quality of care provided).
9
These states were selected based on their variation in the organization of
health care delivery.
10
See Blendon, infra Part III and note 99.
11
See Rosch, infra Part III and note 101.
12
See infra Part IV.A.1–4.
13
Albert O. Hirschman, Excerpt from Chapter Eight of EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970), in 24 SOC. CONT.
272, 272 (1994) (discussing two polar options by which a person may respond to
unsatisfactory circumstances: leave the situation or speak up for change).
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benefit of investing in a value-based model without meaningful
patient engagement. The MSSP patient-centered criteria can help
these organizations achieve necessary patient engagement and
accomplish the triple aim of better health, better care, and reduced
14
costs.
The MSSP legal roadmap includes safety zones to address
antitrust and other market abuses. This Article suggests that ACOs,
regardless of their participation in the MSSP, should align as closely
to the MSSP criteria as possible to avoid legal scrutiny. The MSSP
multi-tier system of governance can diffuse the ACO concept
throughout the nation. By using a national framework with vertical
and horizontal dimensions, the MSSP can allow for variation in local
ACOs while providing a mechanism for learning across ACOs
regionally and nationally, which is currently occurring in Wisconsin
and New Jersey. Part V of this Article revisits Wisconsin and New
Jersey, as well as the private market, to understand how the MSSP is
impacting collaborative efforts in those markets.
Part VI identifies challenges and gaps in the MSSP that leaders
in government and the market need to address to ensure that ACOs
continue to thrive and achieve the goals of better health, better care,
15
and lower costs. As noted by Ezekiel Emanuel, there is an inevitable
trade-off between rising health care costs and other public goods,
16
such as access to college and good wages for working Americans.
Implemented cohesively and comprehensively, the MSSP has the
potential to free up the significant resources currently spent on
health care so that Americans can benefit from other public goods
while not sacrificing their health.
II. THE CASE FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE
A. Accountable Care Pays for Value
No one on either side of the political aisle contends that the
United States health care system is optimally cost efficient. Health
care spending in the United States amounted to $2.6 trillion in 2010,
or 17.9 percent of the entire Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and is

14

See infra Part II.A and note 24.
See infra Part VI and note 264.
16
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, What We Give Up for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012,
5:41 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/what-we-give-up-forhealth-care/ (arguing that controlling health care costs is a necessary trade-off in
order to maintain other public goods, such as education and national strength).
15
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anticipated to rise to about $4.6 trillion, or 19.8 percent of the GDP
17
Researchers have shown that the United States health
by 2020.
system lacks quality, particularly in contrast to other industrialized
18
countries.
According to one source, one major cause of these
problems is that current payment systems encourage volume-driven
19
That is, providers “gain
care, rather than value-driven care.
increased revenues and profits by delivering more services to more
people, fueling inflation in health care costs without any
20
corresponding improvement in outcomes.”
The volume-based
system also unfortunately penalizes providers financially for
accomplishing the laudable goals of keeping people healthy,
21
reducing errors and complications, and avoiding unnecessary care.
As a result of these persistent problems, there is general agreement
that the cost of health care has risen to untenable levels and is
threatening the future of Medicare and the economic well-being of
22
the United States.
One solution to the high cost, low quality dilemma is
23
accountable care provided by ACOs. As noted by Thomas Greaney,
“ACOs offer a much-needed vehicle for integrating health care
delivery and reducing the well-documented shortcomings of the
system that are attributable to payment and organizational features
17

HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTHCARE COSTS: A PRIMER (May 2012),
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7670-03.pdf; CTR. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2010 HIGHLIGHTS (last visited Oct.
6,
2012),
available
at
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads
/highlights.pdf; CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2010 – 2020 (last visited Oct. 6, 2012), available at
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/proj2010.pdf; see also David
Blumenthal, Performance Improvement in Health Care—Seizing the Moment, 366 N. ENGL.
J. MED. 1953, 1954 (2012) (projecting health care spending to be 20.1% of GDP in
2021 and setting a goal for the federal government to “reduce national health care
expenditures by $893 billion over 10 years” in order to hold health care spending to
less than 19% of GDP).
18
See T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER,
AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE 31 (2009); Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better
Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1418 (2009).
19
Miller, supra note 18, at 1418.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Alex D. Federman et al., Physicians’ Opinions About Reforming Reimbursement:
Results of a National Survey, 170 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1735, 1735 (2010), available at
http://acpinternist.acponline.org/sir/docs/rm/journal/federman_phys.pdf.
23
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A).
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24

that reward high volume rather than low cost or high quality.”
There is no precise definition of accountable care, but health
25
industry leaders have attributed the concept to Dr. Elliott Fisher. In
a 2006 Health Affairs article, Dr. Fisher described the development of
partnerships between hospitals and physicians to coordinate and
26
deliver efficient care.
According to the American Hospital
Association, the ACO concept seeks to remove existing barriers to
27
improve the value of care. The most significant barrier that the
ACO concept seeks to remove is a payment system that rewards the
volume and intensity of provided services instead of quality and cost
28
performance. A related, yet independently substantial, barrier that
the ACO system seeks to remove is the widely held assumption that
29
more medical care is equivalent to higher quality care. Others have
defined accountable care organizations as “affiliations of health care
providers that are held jointly accountable for achieving
30
improvements in the quality of care and reductions in spending.”
The ACA aimed to establish the MSSP by January 1, 2012, in
order to “promote[] accountability for a patient population,
coordinate[] items and services under [Medicare] Parts A and B, and
encourage[] investment in infrastructure and redesigned care
31
processes for high quality and efficient service delivery.” The MSSP
final regulations, issued on November 2, 2011, define “accountable
care organization (ACO)” as a legal entity that is (1) recognized and
authorized under applicable State, Federal, or tribal law, (2)
identified by a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), and (3)
formed by one or more ACO participants that are defined in §
425.102(a) and may also include any other ACO participants

24

Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 364
ENGL.
J.
MED.
e1
(Jan.
6,
2011),
available
at
N.
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1013404; see also Federman et al.,
supra note 22, at 1735 (noting that accountable care is gaining considerable
attention as a mechanism to “‘bend the cost curve’ of health care expenditures while
maintaining or improving health care quality”).
25
AHA RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7.
26
Id. (citing Elliott Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The
Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44 (2006)).
27
AHA RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7 (citing Elliott Fisher et al.,
Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. W219
(2009), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/28/2/w219).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Greaney, supra note 24.
31
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1).
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32

described in § 425.102(b).
Upon meeting certain requirements,
groups of service providers and suppliers that have established a
mechanism for shared governance are eligible to participate as
33
34
ACOs. Participation in the MSSP is voluntary. The MSSP allows
groups of providers and suppliers to work together to manage and
35
Once
coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries.
formed, the ACO becomes “accountable for the quality, cost, and
overall care of the Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to
36
the ACO.”
In conjunction with the MSSP, the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services launched the Pioneer ACO model, which
parallels the MSSP program in many ways, but was constructed from
the outset to be a limited term experiment “to test the effectiveness of
37
a particular model of payment.” Like the MSSP, Pioneer aimed to
meet “the three-part aim of better health, better health care, and
lower per-capita costs for Medicare, Medicaid and Children’s Health
38
Insurance Program beneficiaries.”
However, in contrast to the
32

42 C.F.R. § 425.20. 42 CFR § 425.102(a) includes ACO professionals in group
practice arrangements; networks of individual practices of ACO professionals;
partnerships or joint venture arrangements between hospitals and ACO
professionals; hospitals employing ACO professionals; Critical Access Hospitals that
bill under Method II (as described in 42 CFR § 413.70(b)(3)); Rural Health Centers;
and Federally Qualified Health Centers. Id. 42 CFR § 425.102(b) states that other
“ACO participants that are not identified in paragraph (a) of this section are eligible
to participate through an ACO formed by one or more of the ACO participants
identified in paragraph (a) of this section.” 42 C.F.R. § 425.102(b). Note that an
“ACO professional” is defined as “an ACO provider/supplier who is either” a
physician (doctor of medicine or doctor of osteopathy), a physician’s assistant, a
nurse practitioner, or a clinical nurse specialist. 42 C.F.R. § 425.20. Also, the
definition of hospital limits “hospital,” for the purposes of the MSSP, to those
hospitals “subject to the prospective payment system specified in § 412.1(a)(1).”
Social Security Act §§ 1899(b)(1)(A)–(E); 42 C.F.R. § 425.102(a)–(b).
33
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(1).
34
See 42 C.F.R. § 425.100 (which uses the permissive word “may” in regard to
participation of ACO providers in the Shared Savings Program). See also 42 C.F.R. §§
425.200, 425.202 (outlining terms of the participation agreement, and outlining
application procedures).
35
See 42 C.F.R. §§ 425.100, 425.200, 425.202.
36
See id.
37
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PIONEER ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATION MODEL: GENERAL FACT SHEET (Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.cap.org/apps/docs/statline/pdf/pioneer_aco_fact_sheet.pdf
[hereinafter PIONEER GENERAL FACT SHEET]. Pioneer comes out of the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, which received its mandate through the ACA
amendment to section 1115 of the Social Security Act and was created as of January
1, 2011. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (amended by ACA § 3021 (2010)).
38
Notice, Medicare Program: Pioneer Accountable Care Organization Model:
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MSSP, the Pioneer ACO was designed to rapidly move large health
39
care organizations to population-based payment arrangements.
Pioneer’s main purpose is “to support vanguard organizations” in
ongoing processes of transformation already entered into by the
40
organizations. Most significantly, Pioneer ACOs were required to
commit “to entering outcomes-based contracts with other purchasers
(private health plans, state Medicaid agencies, and/or self-insured
employers) such that the majority of the ACO’s total revenues
(including from Medicare) [would] be derived from such
arrangements, by the end of the second performance period in
41
December 2013.” In creating the Pioneer ACO model, the Center
for Innovation chose to focus on large health care organizations, with
at least “15,000 aligned beneficiaries” for the non-rural ACOs and
42
greater than 5,000 beneficiaries for the rural ACOs. Consequently,
the Pioneer ACOs were expected to already have the necessary legal
structure to permit receipt and distribution of incentive payments
43
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
ACOs can take a variety of organizational forms, such as
integrated delivery systems, primary care or multispecialty medical
groups, hospital-based systems, and contractual or virtual networks of

Request for Applications, 76 Fed.Reg. 29249, 29250 (May 20, 2011).
39
PIONEER GENERAL FACT SHEET, supra note 37.
40
Pioneer Accountable Care Organization (ACO) Model Request for Application, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID INNOVATION I.B (released May 17, 2011), available at
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/x/Pioneer-ACO-Model-Request-For-Applicationsdocument.pdf [hereinafter Pioneer Request]; see also Pioneer ACO Model, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/ACO/Pioneer
/index.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
41
Pioneer Request, supra note 40 at II.I.
42
Id. at I.E.
43
See id. at II.C. The ACA also set up the Independence at Home Medical
Practice Demonstration Program that uses “home-based primary care teams.” See 42
U.S.C. § 1395cc-5, amended by ACA § 3024 (2010). Section 3502 of the ACA provides
for the Secretary of Health and Human Services “to provide grants to or enter into
contracts with eligible entities to establish community based interdisciplinary,
interprofessional [health] teams . . . to support primary care practices” and to
“integrate clinical and community preventive and health promotion services for
patients.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 256a-1 (West 2010). The grants may be used to help
develop the interdisciplinary teams and/or to provide capitated payments. Id. The
ACA also provides for a state option under Medicaid to provide “health homes” to
individuals with chronic conditions, whereby the “health home” will provide
“coordination with a team of health care professionals.” 42 U.S.C. 1396w-4, amended
by ACA § 2703 (2010) (provides a “State option to provide coordinated care through
a health home for individuals with chronic conditions,” whereby the “health home”
will provide medical assistance care through Medicaid).
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physicians, such as independent practice associations. However, all
ACOs, share a common goal to reduce costs while improving quality
45
in health care through better coordination and collaboration.
ACOs reward physicians for collaborating to increase prevention and
the quality of care, “while discouraging overtreatment,
46
undertreatment, and sheer profiteering.”
“Reducing the
fragmented provision of care through improvements in care
coordination and continuity of care may be necessary” before valuebased payment strategies can “successfully contribute to improved
47
health care and cost savings.”
B. The Emergence of an Accountable Care Movement
The accountable care movement has emerged at the local level
over a period of time, albeit through varying mechanisms and at
different paces. One sees two distinct examples of accountable care
emergence in Wisconsin and New Jersey.
l.

The Wisconsin Story

The Wisconsin health care market has a rich culture of
collaboration, which creates an environment ripe for accountable
48
49
Integrated delivery systems are prominent in Wisconsin.
care.
These integrated systems, by definition, collaborate with other types
of health care stakeholders, such as payers, physicians, and acute care
50
institutions like hospitals.
The authors interviewed several
Wisconsin providers for this Article, and all were part of an integrated
51
52
53
system: UW Health, Marshfield Clinic, Dean Health System, and
44

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b); see also Greaney, supra note 24.
See Greaney, supra note 24.
46
Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town can Teach us About
Health Care, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 1, 12, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?curren
tPage=all.
47
Federman et al., supra note 22, at 1740.
48
Legislative Symposium, ACO Innovators: Health System Transformation in
Wisconsin, Evidence-Based Health Policy Project (Feb. 22, 2012), available at
http://uwphi.pophealth.wisc.edu/programs/health-policy/ebhpp/events/index
.htm [hereinafter ACO Innovators Symposium].
49
See John S. Toussaint et al., Connecting Statewide Health Information Technology
Strategy to Payment Reform, 17 AM. J. MANAG.CARE e80, e86 (2011), available at
http://www.wchq.org/news/documents/3-18-11_AJMC_Article.pdf; Joe Vanden Plas
et al., Health Care Roundtable, IN BUS.: MADISON, Feb. 2012, at 44, 47–48.
50
ACO Innovators Symposium, supra note 48.
51
Interview with Jonathan Jaffery, Medical Director, UW Health Delivery System
Innovation, University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, in
45
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54

the Monroe Clinic. In addition, the authors attended a presentation
given by a panel of Wisconsin health system leaders that included two
additional systems not interviewed: Bellin-ThedaCare Healthcare
Partners (Bellin) and Gundersen Lutheran Health System
55
(Gundersen Lutheran).
Both of these organizations shared the
56
same integrated system characteristic as the interviewed systems.
Each system has strong affiliations or partnerships with at least
one hospital; each has its own employed physician groups, which
includes both primary care and specialists; and all but two have their
57
own health plans as part of their systems. In addition, none of the
systems were novices with electronic medical records (EMRs); each
58
system has an EMR that it has been using for many years. An EMR is
59
a key ingredient in a successful value-based system of care.
Representatives of many of the Wisconsin systems professed that
they are already providing “accountable care.” For example, Dr. Jeff
Madison, Wis. (Sept. 19, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Jaffery Interview].
52
Interview with Paul Van Den Heuvel, Associate General Counsel, Marshfield
Clinic, in Madison, Wis. (Sept. 26, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Van Den
Heuvel Interview].
53
Interview with Craig Samitt, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Dean Health
System, in Madison, Wis. (Oct. 20, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Samitt
Interview].
54
Interview with Mike Sanders, Chief Exec. Officer, Monroe Clinic, in Monroe,
Wis. (Dec. 21, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sanders Interview].
55
ACO Innovators Symposium, supra note 48.
56
Id.
57
UW Health’s insurance arm is Unity Health Insurance, Dean Health System’s
insurance arm is Dean Health Plan, Marshfield Clinic’s insurance arm is Security
Health Plan, and Gundersen’s plan is Gundersen Lutheran Health Plan. ACO
Innovators Symposium, supra note 48.
58
UW Health, Dean, Bellin, and Monroe Clinic all use Epic, which is based in
Madison, Wisconsin, while Marshfield Clinic and Gundersen built their own
electronic medical record systems which have been in place for twenty years. Jaffery
Interview, supra note 51; Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52; Samitt Interview,
supra note 53; Sanders Interview, supra note 54; George Kerwin, Chief Exec. Officer,
Bellin, Presentation at ACO Innovators Symposium (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter
Kerwin Presentation]; Jeff Thompson, Chief Exec. Officer, Gundersen Lutheran,
Presentation at ACO Innovators Symposium (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Thompson
Presentation].
59
But see Clifford Goodman, Savings in Electronic Medical Record Systems? Do it for
the Quality, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1124, 1126 (2005) (“The capacity for transformation will
arise when this system enables new forms of high-speed, broadly integrated data
collection, analysis, and knowledge development and transfer in a value-based health
care market.”); James M. Walker, Electronic Medical Records and Health Care
Transformation, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1118, 1120 (2005) (noting the need for “powerful
financial incentives—such as pay-for-performance—that will reward organizations for
using EMRs to improve the quality and efficiency of U.S. health care”).
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Thompson stated that Gundersen Lutheran already has various
60
insured populations for which the system is accountable.
Gundersen Lutheran developed a care coordination program that
assigned a social worker to manage the care of the top one percent of
61
patients, measured by resource consumption.
This care
62
coordination includes addressing social issues of the patient.
Unfortunately, this program is not compatible with the current
payment system, causing Gundersen Lutheran to lose approximately
63
$10 million in charges each year that the system could otherwise bill.
Dr. Craig Samitt similarly noted that Dean Health System already
64
functions as an ACO through its integrated delivery system. Dean’s
physicians, hospital, and health plan are “working collaborations”
that “maximize quality and outcomes without overspending the
65
patient’s resources.” According to Dr. Samitt, “[a]ccountable care is
66
Dr. Jonathan
a delivery system objective, not a payer contract.”
Jaffery pointed out that UW Health has a quality and safety
infrastructure that has been in place for a long time and that
Wisconsin has good reporting systems that function to hold providers
67
accountable.
Mike Sanders explained that the Monroe Clinic
participates in the Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare Quality
(WCHQ) and views its participation as a method of measuring quality
68
benchmarks on certain chronic diseases.
Indeed, each of the Wisconsin systems highlighted in this Article
are part of the Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare Quality, which
“comprises twenty-seven organizations, representing most of
69
Wisconsin’s physicians.”
The WCHQ came into being in 2002
through the efforts of one physician leader, Dr. John Toussaint, CEO
of ThedaCare, who wanted to address the “crisis in healthcare quality
70
and the growing drumbeat for reform.” Dr. Toussaint invited the
leaders from Dean Health System, Gundersen Lutheran, Bellin
Health, and Marshfield Clinic, as well as leaders from eight major
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Thompson Presentation, supra note 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Samitt Interview, supra note 53.
Id.
Id.
Jaffery Interview, supra note 51.
Sanders Interview, supra note 54.
Toussaint, supra note 49, at e81.
Id. at e80.
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employers from Wisconsin, to “explore the possibility of using quality
71
reporting to improve healthcare.” The WCHQ currently partners
with business coalitions, consumer advocates, governmental agencies,
foundations, and healthcare associations to gain a more balanced
and complete understanding of what the current state of health care
72
is and how it can be improved. The WCHQ provides an opportunity
for a broad spectrum of stakeholders, many of which compete with
73
one another, to share best practices and gain valuable perspectives.
Through a collaborative effort, the WCHQ developed clinical
performance data that consumers can use to compare certain quality
74
measures across competing organizations. Thus, the WCHQ not
only demonstrates that collaboration may be a more powerful tool
than competition, but also the advantage in giving consumers tools to
75
have more “skin in the [health care] game.”
Chris Queram, the current CEO of the WCHQ, attributes the
collaborative spirit among Wisconsin health care competitors to a
systematic dismantling of the regulatory model that occurred
76
approximately twenty years ago. Wisconsin eliminated regulatory
71

Id. at e80–e81.
Id. at e81.
73
Id. at e81.
74
Id. at e81–e83. The WCHQ posts clinical performance data on a website.
Toussaint supra note 49, at e81; View Our Reports, WISCONSIN COLLABORATIVE FOR
HEALTHCARE QUALITY, http://www.wchq.org/reporting/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
Initial results from the performance compilation showed significant variations in
costs and quality. Most surprising to the hospital administrators was an inverse
relationship between costs and quality—”higher cost hospitals were less likely to meet
benchmarks for quality.” Merrill Goozner, Quality, Economy, Transparency: A New
Health
Care
Code,
FISCAL
TIMES
(May
10,
2010),
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Issues/Health-Care/2010/05/10/How-A-WisconsinProgram-Can-Save-Americas-Health-Care-System.aspx.
Wisconsin
hospitals
responded to the data reporting by seeking to improve both quality performance
and cost measures. Id. Collaborative efforts among competitors to publish pricing
terms within the Wisconsin healthcare industry could, however, be viewed as
collusion if it were to increase prices or decrease available health care options. See id.
(citing Michael Cowie, former Federal Trade Commission official). The results
noticed in Wisconsin are not unusual. Atul Gawande noticed a similar pattern in
Texas. See Gawande, supra note 46.
75
Jaffery Interview, supra note 51; Samitt Interview, supra note 53. “Skin in the
game” is a phrase coined by Warren Buffet that refers to insiders investing within the
same company that they manage.
INVESTOPEDIA FINANCIAL DICTIONARY,
http://www.answers.com/topic/skin-in-the-game (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). In the
healthcare context, it refers to patients investing in their own health, through
healthcare decision-making, healthy life style choices, and copayments. Id.
76
Interview with Chris Queram, Chief Exec. Officer, Wisconsin Collaborative for
Healthcare Quality, in Madison, Wis. (Feb. 20, 2012) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Queram Interview].
72
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structures such as the Certificate of Need and rate review of
77
insurers. In exchange for eliminating these forms of government
regulation, the Wisconsin Hospital Association agreed to a
requirement that hospitals submit discharge data to the Wisconsin
Office of Healthcare Information so that the state and other
78
stakeholders would have tools to review the health care market.
Almost ten years elapsed before this dataset was used for public
reporting. Once begun, the public reporting created a dynamic
change in the Wisconsin health care culture from what had been an
attitude of “denial” by health care providers to one of providers
wanting to “get out in front of the data” and “at least” meet the
79
reporting “half-way.” Thus, although the government moved away
from direct control of the health care market, the demand for
transparency in the form of public information encouraged self80
regulation and education between providers.
Dr. Toussaint took the initiative to create the WCHQ because he
81
recognized an unacceptable variability in physician quality data. As
Medical Director for Touchpoint Health Plan, Dr. Toussaint became
®
82
familiar with HEDIS data and was concerned when he learned that
the standard of care differed between people in Medicare, Medicaid,
83
and the Touchpoint private plans. According to Mr. Queram, Dr.
Toussaint “wanted to build a performance model for all patients
84
To do that, he needed other providers to
regardless of payer.”
participate so that there could be valuable benchmarks against which
85
to measure each of the participants. And, in order for this effort to
have credibility in the market, he recognized that the business
community needed to play an active role in its development. Trust
and cooperation developed slowly. Mr. Queram explains that it took
more than a year for the providers and the business partners to
develop trust and to find “common ground” and “aspirations . . . to
77

Id.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
HEDIS® is a healthcare performance measurement tool, provided by the
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) that “consists of 76 measures
across 5 domains of care” and “is used by more than 90% of America’s health plans.”
WHAT IS HEDIS?, NCQA, http://www.ncqa.org/tabid/187/Default.aspx (last visited
Oct. 5, 2012).
83
Queram Interview, supra note 76.
84
Id.
85
Id.
78
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86

build a measurement method that works.”
As noted above,
participation in the WCHQ has, for some providers, been the vehicle
by which they measure and demonstrate the provision of accountable
87
care in Wisconsin.
2.

The New Jersey Story

In contrast to the prevalence of integrated systems in Wisconsin,
New Jersey’s healthcare market consists mainly of small physician
88
practices. Ten years ago, in 2002, more than sixty percent of New
Jersey physicians practiced solo or in small, private two- to five-person
89
New Jersey has remarkably few private multi-specialist
groups.
groups, and its smaller physician groups tend to be fragmented and
90
non-collaborative.
Yet despite fragmented physician groups, New Jersey has
initiatives that are arguably precursors of ACOs.
There are
collaboratives to improve patient safety in the Intensive Care Unit
91
and to decrease rapid response times. Disease-based collaboratives
are working together to decrease pressure ulcers and to improve
92
In 2009, under the auspices of the New Jersey
perinatal care.
Hospital Association (NJHA), CMS funded a three-year gain-sharing
93
pilot project. The New Jersey Care Integration Consortium provides
94
quality monitoring for improved performance. All members must
86

Id.
Toussaint, supra note 49, at e81.
88
Seminar, NJ Off. Legis. Serv., Rutgers Ctr. for State Health Pol’y, The New Jersey
Physician Workforce: Findings from the NJ State Physician Census (Oct. 27, 2004), available
at www.cshp.rutgers.edu/PDF/CSHP_OLS/OLSNJPhysCensus.pdf; see also Kevin
Post, Shore Physicians Group Offers Multispecialty Care, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (March
13, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/communities/northfield
_linwood_somers-point/shore-physicians-group-offers-multispecialty-care/article
_2292e0a0-6d56-11e1-bcfd-0019bb2963f4.html.
89
Id.
90
Stephen Jones, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Robert Wood Johnson
University Hospital System, Academic Medical Centers and ACOs: Partners in Success or
Rivals for Attention in the New Enviroment?, Presentation at the University of Miami
Global Business Forum: The Business of Health Care: Defining the Future (Jan. 12–
14, 2011), available at http://www.bus.miami.edu/_assets/files/gbf-2011/Jones.pdf,.
91
Internal Memorandum from Elizabeth A. Ryan, President and Chief Exec.
Officer, N.J. Hosp. Assoc., to other N.J. Hosp. Assoc. Officers (Sept. 9, 2011) (on file
with author).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Sean Hopkins, Sr. Vice President, Health Economics, N.J. Hosp. Assoc.,
Address at the NJ HIMSS Spring Event “Health Care Reform School”: The National
Healthcare Reform Law—What it means to the New Jersey Healthcare Community
87
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95

participate in the quality collaboratives. All participating hospitals
have a consumer on the board and there is an overall steering
96
committee with a quality oversight group. Hospital and physician
97
incentives are aligned. The elaborate incentive system is bonus only
and is based on individual performance with no change in current
98
payments from payers.
III. ACO SKEPTICISM
Not everyone is enthusiastic about the move toward ACOs. It is
not yet clear whether ACOs will deliver the promised higher-quality,
lower-cost system promised. The source of ACO critics’ skepticism
derives from two complementary perspectives based on the history of
efforts to coordinate care and reduce costs. First, critics point to the
99
disappointing managed care experience in the 1990s, and fear that
if ACOs focus on keeping costs low without significantly improving
access and quality, the ACO movement will be destined to the same
100
fate as managed care.
Second, critics fear that collaborative efforts can be abused,
101
misused, and can create a euphemism for anticompetitive conduct.
For example, Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) believes that the net result of the Medicare
Shared Savings Program may be higher costs and lower quality health
102
care, precisely the opposite of the program’s goal.
From an
antitrust standpoint, greater collaboration creates greater potential
(May
26,
2010),
PowerPoint
presentation
available
at
http://njhimss.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=116:njhimssspring-eventqhealthcare-reform-schoolq&catid=65:past-events&Itemid=115.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Sean Hopkins, Sr. Vice President Health Economics, Presentation at the N.J.
Hosp. Assoc. N.J. Care Integration Consortium: Overview and Implementation (May
26, 2010).
98
Letter from Elizabeth A. Ryan, President & CEO, N.J. Hosp. Assoc., to Chief
Executive Officers, Chief Operating Officers, Chief Financial Officers, Government
Relations Officers, N.J. Hosp. Assoc. (Sept. 9, 2011) (on file with author).
99
Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, 17 HEALTH
AFF. 80, 81 (1998), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/17/4
/80.full.pdf+html.
100
Blendon et al., supra note 99, at 80.
101
J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed.Trade Comm’n., Accountable Care
Organizations: What Exactly Are We Getting?, at 15, Speech at the Am. Bar Assoc.
Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum (Nov. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/111117fallforumspeech.pdf.
102
Id.
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for market manipulation, which could further drive up health care
103
costs.
Critics worry that ACOs are nothing but a revival of the managed
care organizations (MCOs) that ultimately proved unpopular in the
104
last part of the twentieth century.
In 1998, Robert Blendon wrote
that a majority of Americans expressed concern that managed care
105
might deny people the services they need when they are very sick.
Others wrote that managed care eroded the trust between health care
organizations and consumers because of consumers’ fear “of being
exploited by health care organizations furthering their self106
interest.”
For example, Mark Schlesinger argued that a prepaid
health plan that responds solely to financial incentives will allocate its
resources in ways that minimize its expected medical costs, consistent
107
with maintenance of a stable set of satisfied enrollees.
The
following brief history of managed care and the consumerism
movement provides perspective for understanding the ACO
movement.
A. History of Managed Care and Consumerism
In the early 1980s, MCOs emerged out of concern with rising
108
costs of health care. Congress passed the Health Maintenance
109
Organization (HMO) Act of 1973 in response to a call by former
President Richard Nixon to address the rising cost of health care
110
before it crippled the productivity of the United States. The ideal
model was a strong central managing organization that controlled
111
access to care and restricted the work of health care professionals.
103

Id.
Final Rule, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67805 (Nov. 2, 2011) [hereinafter MSSP Final
Rule]; see also Blendon, supra note 99.
105
Blendon, supra note 99, at 84.
106
Mark Schlesinger et al., A Broader Vision for Managed Care, Part 2: A Typology of
Community Benefits, 17 HEALTH AFF. 26, 34 (1998), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/17/5/26.full.pdf+html.
107
Id. at 33. For example, Schlesinger notes that “HMOs with these motives thus
have little incentive to address problems of substance abuse aggressively—they do
not bear the bulk of the costs and would prefer having enrollees with these problems
become dissatisfied and switch to another plan.” Id. This behavior exacerbates the
burden of substance abuse for the community as a whole. Id.
108
Edward Richards, The Rise of MCOs, Public Health Law Map, LSU LAW CTR.,
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/TheRiseofMCOs.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
109
42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (1973).
110
Richards, supra note 108.
111
See, e.g., Ronald Lagoe et al., Current and Future Developments in Managed Care in
104
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This model required gatekeeping and capitation (a fixed sum for a
112
package of services), and included substantial cost-saving incentives.
Physicians were the major losers: they felt demeaned and frustrated
113
by the dual losses of autonomy and income.
Patients were fearful
that the new system focused too much on controlling costs instead of
114
For example, the media reported that MCOs
delivering services.
115
paid physicians bonuses for limiting patients’ health care use.
116
Physicians helped fuel this fear.
The fear and criticism of managed care led to the introduction
both in Congress and in state legislatures of more than a thousand
117
bills dealing with consumer protection in managed care.
Many
labeled these laws as the Patients’ Bill of Rights and they were
118
enacted in many states. These documents aimed to create a more
humane managed care system by influencing the internal structures
119
of the MCOs and using data-driven evaluation systems.
The
the United States and Implications for Europe, 2005 HEALTH RES. POL’Y & SYSTEMS (March
17, 2005), available at http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/3/1/4.
112
See Christopher B. Forrest, Primary Care Gatekeeping and Referrals: Effective Filter
or Failed Experiment?, 326 BMJ 692, 692–95 (Mar. 29, 2003), available at
http://www.bmj.com/content/326/7391/692.1.pdf%2Bhtml.
113
Hal Teitelbaum, Chief Exec. Officer, Crystal Run Healthcare, Presentation at
Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: Implementing the Affordable Care Act: What
Role for Accountable Care Organizations? (Oct. 28, 2011).
114
Lagoe et al., supra note 111.
115
Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ Attitudes Toward Cost Control Bonuses for
Managed Care Physicians, 20 HEALTH AFF. 186, 186 (2001).
116
Mary Guptill Warren et al., The Impact of Managed Care on Physicians, 24
CARE
MANAGE
REV.
44,
44
(1999),
available
at
HEALTH
http://www.public.asu.edu/~atssk/ssk_hcmr99.pdf.
117
Blendon, supra note 99, at 81; see generally Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et al.,
National Survey of Patients’ Bill of Rights Statutes, 24 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 489–94 (2009),
available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/j4776732r66m8126/?MUD=MP.
118
Paasche-Orlow, supra note 117; Patient Rights, MEDLINE PLUS, U.S. NAT’L
LIBRARY
OF
MED.
(Aug.
20,
2012),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/patientrights.html; Patient’s Bill of Rights,
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, (Dec. 22, 2011). For examples of how the United States
government views the ACA as a Patients’ Bill of Rights, see Patients’ Bill of Rights,
HEALTHCARE.GOV (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.heatlhcare.gov/law/features/rights
/bill-of-rights/index.html; Reducing Costs, Protecting Consumers: The Affordable Care Act
on the One Year Anniversary of the Patient’s Bill of Rights, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Sept. 29,
2011),
http://www.healthcare.gov/law/resources/reports/patients-bill-ofrights09232011a.html.
Interestingly, the American Hospital Association first
proposed a Patient’s Bill of Rights in 1973. G. J. Annas, A.H.A. Bill of Rights, 9 TRIAL
59–61 (1973).
119
D. M. Nadzen et al., Data-driven Performance Improvement in Health Care: the Joint
Commission’s Indicator Measurement System (IMSystem), 19 JT. COMM. J. QUAL. IMPROV.
492–500 (1993), available at http://ukpmc.ac.uk/abstract/MED/8313012.
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regulatory agencies retained oversight; but substantial governance
120
The Patients’ Bill of
was transferred to the MCOs and patients.
Rights, supported by both physician and patient groups, softened a
121
draconian system.
The American Medical Association strongly
122
Government officials, MCOs, insurers,
supported the legislation.
and large companies who paid for healthcare coverage and wanted to
reduce the high cost of health care opposed the Patients’ Bill of
123
Rights.
The successful passage of the legislation taught the
physicians about the power of the alliance of the patient groups and
124
the physicians.
The mixed history of managed care led to the rise of the
consumerist approach. It is an alternative to managed care aimed at
125
controlling costs and increasing choice in health care.
One
definition of consumerism is “individual choice within a health care
marketplace characterized by the exchange of money for health care
126
goods or services.” According to this theory, the consumer relies on
information from many different sources, analogous to the consumer
127
shopping in the supermarket.
The consumerist approach tries to
differentiate between the consumer and the supposedly passive
128
It views the consumer as different from the
patient of the past.
120

Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for
Health Care, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575 (2002).
121
See, e.g., Marin McDonald, Fighting Against the Evils of For-Profit Health Care: The
Patients “Bill of Rights”, J. POVERTY AND PREJUDICE: SOCIAL SECURITY AT THE CROSSROADS
(1999), available at http://www.stanford.edu/class/e297c/poverty_prejudice/soc_sec
/fighting.htm.
122
The AMA issued its ethics opinion 10.01 in June 1992, advocating a Patient’s
Bill of Rights, based on its report, Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician
Relationship, 262 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. (1992), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics
/opinion1001.page.
123
See Trubek, supra note 120; see also Reid, supra note 18, at 37 (explaining that
“the money paid to doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies for treatment of insured
patients is referred to as ‘medical loss’” by the “U.S. health insurance industry.”).
The for-profit health insurance industry seeks to “maintain a medical loss ratio of
about 80 percent.” Reid, supra note 18, at 37.
124
See Kristin Madison, Patients as “Regulators”? Patients’ Evolving Influence over
Health Care Delivery, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 9, 31–32 (2010), available at
http://tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01947641003598195; Trubek, supra note
120; see also Donald M. Berwick, ESCAPE FIRE: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF HEALTH
CARE 51–55 (2002).
125
Madison, supra note 124.
126
Id. at 15.
127
Id.
128
Id.
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patient, in that the patient is needy and dependent; while the
consumer engages in sorting out his or her own preferences by
129
The consumer-patient
gathering his or her own information.
®
gathers information from web-based sites such as WebMD and
health care report cards issued by private and public organizations,
130
Consumer-directed health care plans are
among other sources.
131
another component of the consumerist approach.
These plans
feature high deductibles in exchange for lower premiums, requiring
132
purchasers to act more like consumers.
These consumerist approaches allow patients to assert
themselves in relation to the physician and also into the health care
133
market.
Once mechanisms like health care report cards and easy
public reporting of outcomes emerged, reformist providers realized
134
By the time the ACA
that engagement with patients was essential.
was written, active engagement with patients seemed to be an
135
important strategy for reformist physicians.
Consumerism, however, has important limits. By turning the
patient into a consumer and health care into a business, it creates the
136
potential for a “buyer beware” world. Additionally, it risks treating
physicians as entrepreneurs rather than professionals bound by a

129

L. Rosenberg, Are Healthcare Leaders Ready for the Real Revolution?, 39 J. BEHAV.
HEALTH. SERV. RES. 215–19 (2012). But see PHILIP BREDESEN, FRESH MEDICINE: HOW TO
FIX REFORM AND BUILD A SUSTAINABLE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 114–15 (2010).
130
See, e.g., WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2012);
CHECKPOINT, http://www.wicheckpoint.org/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2012);
Health
Plan
Report
Card,
NCQA,
http://reportcard.ncqa.org/plan/external/plansearch.aspx (last visited Oct. 5,
2012).
131
Madison, supra note 124.
132
But see Paul Krugman, Patients are not Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011, at
A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/opinion/22krugman.html.
133
Ronald E. Bachman, Healthcare Consumerism: The Basis of a 21st Century
Intelligent Health System, CTR. FOR HEALTH TRANSFORMATION, 2–3 (2006), available at
http://www.healthcarevisions.net/f/2006_Healthcare_Consumerism_CHT.pdf; see
also WYE RIVER GROUP ON HEALTHCARE, AN EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTHCARE
CONSUMERISM, 7–13 (2006), available at http://www.wrgh.org/docs/hc_consumerism
_guide.pdf.
134
See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick, supra note 124; Atul Gawande, The Hot Spotters:
Can We Lower Medical Costs by Giving the Neediest Patients Better Care?, NEW YORKER, Jan.
24,
2011,
at
40,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/01/24/110124fa_fact_gawande.
135
Madison, supra note 124, at 31–32.
136
See, e.g., Ha T. Tu & Jessica H. May, Self-Pay Markets In Health Care: Consumer
Nirvana Or Caveat Emptor?, 26 HEALTH AFF. w217–w226 (2007), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/2/w217.full.
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137

professional code of ethics.
Finally, and most importantly, it
138
assumes that the patient has the ability to be an active consumer.
Although the time when patients are most likely to engage the health
139
care system is when they are ill, frail, and weak, a patient who is
acutely ill may not be able to act as an active and intelligently
140
For example, a patient who is being
involved consumer.
transported by ambulance for emergency medical care rarely gets to
141
choose the hospital. Patients who are ill need support systems. The
consumerism movement, like managed care, did not sufficiently
account for the difficulty in creating an effective role for
consumers/patients within a complex health care system.
The accountable care reformers are aware of the skepticism
142
about patient involvement that remains from the previous efforts.
They learned from the managed care experience that patient support
143
is essential for changing the delivery of medical care.
The public
reaction to the MCO tools—gatekeepers, financial incentives, and
utilization management—resulted in both market resistance and
144
legislation that watered down the model.
Despite this watering
down, many of the newly revised MCOs were successful, with many of
145
The reformers
the changes reducing costs and improving care.
137

See, e.g., Michael Anft, Hospital, Heal Thyself, 64 JOHNS HOPKINS MAG. 37, 38–39
(2012) (reviewing MARTY MAKARY, UNACCOUNTABLE: WHAT HOSPITALS WON’T TELL
YOU AND HOW TRANSPARENCY CAN REVOLUTIONIZE HEALTH CARE (2012)). For a
professional code for physicians, see, e.g., Code of Medical Ethics, AM. MEDICAL ASS’N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/codemedical-ethics (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). As part of its code, the A.M.A. states that
“the relationship between patient and physician is based on trust and gives rise to
physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare above their own self-interest
and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their patients’ welfare.”
Opinion 10.015 - The Patient-Physician Relationship, AM. MEDICAL ASS’N (Dec. 21, 2001),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/codemedical-ethics/opinion10015.page?
138
Bachman, supra note 133; WYE RIVER GROUP ON HEALTHCARE, supra note 133.
139
See BREDESEN, supra note 129.
140
See id. at 15–16.
141
Instead, the choice of hospital is considered a medical decision to be made by
professionals in accordance with a regional emergency medical services protocol.
See, e.g., Emergency Patient Destinations and Hospital Diversion, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
HEALTH, http://www.health.ny.gov/nysdoh/ems/policy/06-01.htm (last visited Oct.
6, 2012).
142
THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH
POLICY: A CLINICAL APPROACH 199 (5th ed. 2009).
143
Id.
144
See generally, Mark A. Hall, The ‘Death’ of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30
J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 427 (2005).
145
Id.
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learned from consumerism that information could lead to positive
changes in healthcare and that technology allows for more
146
transparency of information. The knowledge about system reform
and the role of patients—learned from managed care and
147
consumerism—contributed to the design of the MSSP.
B. Failed Promises of Higher Quality, Lower Costs
In addition to fearing a repeat of the managed care debacle,
other critics merely conclude that ACOs fall far short of presenting a
148
panacea for health care. Some, such as Commissioner Rosch, have
expressed concern that “even under the most optimistic scenario,”
Medicare ACOs will only save the nation “less than one tenth of one
149
percent of expected Medicare expenditures over the next decade.”
Jessica Mantel contends that in the long term, ACOs may achieve the
goal of reducing health care costs by making “compromises in the
quality of care they provide to patients, including withholding
150
potentially beneficial care from some patients.”
Mantel concedes
that in the short-term, ACOs have the capacity to reduce wasteful care
151
Nevertheless,
and better manage care of chronically ill patients.
Mantel argues that eliminating wasteful care will deny some patients
152
beneficial care.
She takes the position that managing chronic
conditions may not be as cost-effective as expected because of
increased administrative costs and greater utilization of services

146

For another review of the history of patient-centeredness, see MICHAEL L.
MILLENSON & JULIANA MACRI, URBAN INST., WILL THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MOVE
PATIENT-CENTEREDNESS
TO
CENTER
STAGE?
(2012),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412524-will-the-affordable-care-act.pdf.
147
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 425).
148
See generally Jessica L. Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our
Cake and Eat it Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393 (2012); Rosch, supra note 101.
149
Rosch, supra note 101, at 5 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS
VOL.
I:
HEALTH
CARE
72–74
(Dec.
2008),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9925/12-18-HealthOptions.pdf).
150
Mantel, supra note 148.
151
Id. Specifically, Mantel states that because of the financial incentives of
“shared savings or higher margins under capitation,” there will likely be a reduction
in “duplicative tests, unsafe procedures and care lacking in scientific support or
sufficient value.” Id. at 1406. “The economic incentives of ACOs also will foster the
adoption of protocols that reduce the risk of medical errors or complications.” Id. at
1411. In addition, “[t]he financial incentives” of ACOs will “re-orient treatment of
chronic conditions away from treating acute episodes of illness toward better
prevention and patient management.” Id. at 1413–14.
152
Id. at 1418.
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153

through care coordination programs.
Continuing advances in
medical technology will require ACOs to find ways of lowering costs,
which will be difficult for organizations that already have low
154
operating costs without sacrificing quality. Finally, Mantel expresses
concern that “in practice, some ACOs may stint on the care they
provide patients given their financial incentives to do so” (i.e., there
155
will always be “bad apples”).
Others have shared some of Mantel’s concerns that ACOs may
156
not achieve the higher-quality, lower-cost goal in every case.
For
example, Donald Berwick has stated that ACOs in high-cost areas
have greater potential for achieving cost savings than ACOs in lower157
cost areas.
Such dismal outlooks are especially discouraging for
highly integrated health care organizations, like those that exist in
Wisconsin. Such organizations view themselves as already operating
158
leanly.
Another shortcoming of the ACO movement is the fear that the
movement will push provider consolidation, further escalating the
159
costs of health care.
According to Greaney, “the ACO
phenomenon may well encourage some mergers, joint ventures, and
160
alliances that will exacerbate” the market concentration problem.
Economic evidence has shown that hospital consolidation in the
1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at least five percent, and by
forty percent or more when merging hospitals were located close to
161
one another.
Dominant providers can use their market power to
seek higher reimbursements, as well as to deny employers and health
plans the ability to obtain and use cost and quality data to enable
162
them to shop more effectively.
153

Mantel, supra note 148, at 1421–23.
Id. at 1425–26.
155
Id. at 1418.
156
Anna Wilde Mathews, Can Accountable-Care Organizations Improve Health Care
ST.
J.,
Jan.
23,
2012,
While
Reducing
Costs?,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204720204577128901714576054.h
tml (quoting Donald Berwick, former Administrator of the Ctrs. for Medicare and
Medicaid Servs.).
157
Id.
158
See, e.g., Samitt Interview, supra note 53.
159
Greaney, supra note 24, at e1–e2.
160
Id.
161
Id. at e2 (citing C. H. Williams et al., How Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the
Price and Quality of Hospital Care?, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (2006),
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/no9policybrief.pdf).
162
Greaney, supra note 24, at e2.
154
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Indeed, in Wisconsin, seven health systems and a medical school
have banded together to collaborate on an accountable care
163
strategy.
These systems represent twenty-eight hospitals in
Wisconsin, Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, and northern Illinois as well
164
as 4,000 affiliated physicians.
These systems have combined net
165
annual revenue of nearly $6 billion. This collaboration includes a
significant number of hospitals and covers a wide geographic
166
region.
Although collaboration and coordination can be useful
tools to improve health care quality and efficiency, it will be
important for governing bodies to monitor ACO collaborations to
ensure that the fears expressed by Mantel and Greaney are not
realized.
IV. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM
Arguably, the most prominent catalyst in the accountable care
167
movement is the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP).
The
MSSP encourages or mandates the use of shared governance,
information technology, multi-professional practitioners, financial
168
incentives, benchmarks, metrics, and patient participation.
The
program requires population-based accountability, coordinated care,
169
quality health care, and efficiency. It has the potential to transform
the current volume-based system of health care to one based on
170
value. The MSSP Final Rule provides elements that allow ACOs to
succeed, whether inside or outside the MSSP umbrella.
The MSSP Final Rule achieves two important goals: (1) it builds
upon the success of a variety of pilot and experimental programs that
have contained the essential elements of accountable care, such as
171
those developed in Wisconsin and New Jersey, and (2) it answers
163

Competing Health Systems Launch Regional Partnership, WISCONSIN HEALTH NEWS
(Mar. 20, 2012), http://wisconsinhealthnews.com/topstories/competing-healthsystems-launch-regional-partnership.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 425).
168
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), added by § 3022 of ACA.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Some projects that have provided proof of concept for components of the
MSSP ACO include: Physician Group Practice (PGP), Medicaid Section 1115 Waiver,
Section 1315 Waiver, Medicare Disproportionate Share Hospital Scheme, and
Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration Programs. See Social Security Act §
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the skeptics’ concerns about collusion, excessive cost controls,
172
inadequate quality, and ineffective patient engagement. The MSSP
Final Rule provides answers to the concerns expressed in Part III of
this Article through a multi-tiered framework that features patientcentered criteria, a legal roadmap for anti-competitive behavior, and
173
multi-tiered governance structures.
A. The MSSP Patient-Centered Criteria are Critical to ACO Success
The ACO movement rethinks the role of the patient and other
stakeholders in the delivery of healthcare, such as employers,
174
insurers, and other community members.
Generally, patientcentered care improves outcomes by reducing length of stay,
readmissions, and emergency department visits as well as enhancing
175
patient compliance with plans of care.
It also improves patient
176
The comments to the MSSP rules indicate that CMS
satisfaction.
sees patient-centeredness as a crucial aspect to achieving its goals of
177
better care, better health, and lower costs.
ACA mandates that the MSSP adopt a focus on patientcenteredness that is promoted by three broad categories of rules: (1)
patient representation in ACO governance, (2) patient engagement
processes, and (3) quality measures that MSSP participants must meet
178
in order to obtain shared savings.
1115, Pub. L. 105-33 (1997) (permitting the authorization of cost-neutral
“experimental, pilot or demonstration project[s] . . . likely to assist in promoting the
objectives of [the Medicaid statute]”); Benefits Improvement and Protection Act §
412, Pub. L. 106-554 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2010) (providing a waiver for certain
“experimental, pilot, or demonstration project[s]” that promote the objectives of
care for vulnerable populations such as children, the blind, the disabled, and the
elderly); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395ii (2003), added by the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act § 646, Pub. L. 108-173 (2003); Social Security
Act § 1866C(b), added by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act § 646, Pub. L. 108-173 (2003), amended by ACA § 3021(c) (2010).
172
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67840-44.
173
See generally MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802.
174
In this Article, we use the word “patient” for clarity. We have chosen to use
patient to refer to all references to the person buying or receiving services except
when we are specifically discussing consumerism.
175
Barbara Cliff, The Evolution of Patient-Centered Care, 57 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 86,
88 (2012).
176
Id.
177
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67826 (defining “patient engagement” as
“the active participation of patients and their families in the process of making
medical decisions.”).
177
Id.
178
A defining event in the use of the term of “patient-centeredness” is the iconic
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With regard to ACO governance, the final MSSP Rule requires at
least one Medicare beneficiary representative served by the ACO to
179
be on the ACO’s governing body. If an ACO is unable to satisfy the
requirement of beneficiary representation on its governing body, the
MSSP final rules allow ACOs to opt out of the requirement by
providing an explanation for having a different composition of its
180
governing body.
Any ACO that does not meet the composition
criteria must show that it is involving the ACO participants in
innovative ways in ACO governance or that it is providing its
Medicare beneficiaries with “meaningful representation in ACO
181
governance.”
For the patient engagement processes, the MSSP requires ACOs
182
to (1) regularly use a “patient experience of care survey,” (2)
183
provide for a beneficiary representative on its governing body, (3)
evaluate the health needs of its populations and develop plans to
address those populations’ needs, to be achieved in part by
184
partnering with community stakeholder organizations, (4) clearly
communicate relevant “clinical knowledge/evidence-based medicine

Institute of Medicine report issued in 2001, which identified patient-centeredness as
one of the six key goals for health care delivery. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING
THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 40 (2001). The
definitions of “patient-centeredness” vary—one is “health care that patients need and
is provided when they need and in the manner they want.” Karen David et al.,
Aiming High for the U.S. Health System: A Context for Health Reform, 36 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 629, 634–35 (2008). Another definition propounded by the Institute of
Medicine applies “patient-centeredness” to all patient interactions with physicians
and the health care system as a whole. Id.
179
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67821, 67976 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.106(c)(2)). A “Medicare fee-for-service beneficiary” is one who is enrolled in
original Medicare under Parts A and B, but who is not enrolled in a Medicare
Advantage plan under Part C, “[a]n eligible organization under section 1876 of the
Act,” or in “[a] PACE program under section 1894 of the Act.” MSSP Final Rule, 76
Fed. Reg. at 67974-75 (to be codified at 42 CFR § 425.20). Also, that a single
Medicare beneficiary on the governing body is sufficient to satisfy that component of
the MSSP distinctly contrasts to the requirement that “[a]t least 75 percent control of
the ACO’s governing body must be held by ACO participants.” MSSP Final Rule, 76
Fed. Reg. 67976 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 CFR § 425.106(c)(3)).
180
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67976 (to be codified at 42 CFR §
425.106(c)(5)).
181
Id. (emphasis added).
182
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67976-77, 67984 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§
425.112(b)(2)(i), 425.500).
183
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.112(b)(2)(ii)).
184
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.112(b)(2)(iii)).
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185

to beneficiaries” in a way that the beneficiaries can understand, (5)
involve each individual beneficiary in a process of “shared decisionmaking” that reflects that person’s “unique needs, preferences,
186
values, and priorities,”
(6) develop “written standards for
beneficiary access and communication,” including a process by which
187
beneficiaries may access their own medical records, and (7) develop
an “individualized care program” for beneficiaries in high risk groups
to provide for coordinated care throughout an episode of care and
188
during its transitions.
The third patient-centered category relates to the MSSP quality
measures. The MSSP contains thirty-three quality performance
189
standards that ACOs must meet before obtaining shared savings.
Of the thirty-three quality measures selected for the MSSP, seven are
related to the patient’s or caregiver’s experience of care, to which the
final rules give equal weight with measures relating to care
coordination and patient safety, preventive health, and at-risk
190
The seven patient experience measures are: (1)
populations.
“Getting Timely Care, Appointments and Information”; (2) “How
Well Your Doctors Communicate”; (3) “Patients’ Rating of Doctor”;
(4) “Access to Specialists”; (5) “Health Promotion and Education”;
(6) “Shared Decision Making”; and (7) “Health Status/Functional
191
Status.”
Another quality measure worthy of mention is the adoption and
use of Electronic Health Records (EHR) technology. The final MSSP

185

MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.112(b)(2)(iv)).
186
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.112(b)(2)(v)).
187
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.112(b)(2)(vi)).
188
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.112(b)(4)).
189
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67889.
190
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67891; MILLENSON & MACRI, supra note 146,
at 4.
191
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67889; MILLENSON & MACRI, supra note 146,
at 4 n.36. All of these measures are Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Study
(CAHPS) measures. MILLENSON & MACRI, supra note 146, at 4 n.36. “The CAHPS
program is funded and administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, which works with a consortium of private and public organizations that
includes . . . CMS” and other federal agencies. Id. at 4. “These organizations are
responsible for conceiving, developing, testing and refining the various CAHPs
surveys.” Id. at 4 n.36. “The CAHPS surveys seek to assess the patient experience of
care by addressing behaviors the patient directly observes.” Id. at 2.
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rules do not require MSSP participants to adopt EHR technology, but
encourage its adoption by giving it double weight in the calculation
192
of a participant’s quality performance score. EHR adoption will be
critical to ACOs’ ability to monitor population health and improve
quality of care. The Pioneer ACO model also emphasizes EHR, and
Pioneer ACOs must ensure that no less than fifty percent of their
primary care providers are making “meaningful use” of EHR in order
193
to receive EHR incentive payments.
The three broad categories of MSSP patient-centered criteria are
a direct response to the lessons learned from the managed care
backlash and consumerism movement, discussed in Section III.A of
this Article. Incorporating these criteria into ACO development
initiatives and keeping patient engagement at the forefront, whether
within or outside the MSSP, will allow ACOs to experience greater
success and allay many of the fears of rationing and improper
leverage of market power.
1.

The ACO Exit Challenge

The success of the ACO concept, whether as part of the MSSP or
in the commercial market, is subject to Hirschman’s “exit, voice, and
194
loyalty” theory.
That is, in unsatisfactory situations, people can
respond by “exiting” the situation, or raising their “voice” to try and
195
remedy the defects.
Hirschman’s concept of “loyalty” may modify
196
the response, causing one to stand and fight rather than exit.
192

76 Fed. Reg. at 67802, 67985 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.506).
PIONEER GENERAL FACT SHEET, supra note 37. Similar beneficiary-oriented
provisions guide the Pioneer ACOs: the Pioneer ACO model puts a bit more
emphasis on beneficiary involvement in the governance structure and requires both
a beneficiary and a patient advocate to sit on the governing body. CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PIONEER ACO MODEL: A BETTER CARE EXPERIENCE
THROUGH A NEW MODEL OF CARE, FACT SHEET (Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Pioneer-Model-ACO-BeneficiariesRights-Fact-Sheet.pdf [hereinafter PIONEER BENEFICIARIES FACT SHEET]. Although
one person may satisfy both positions, most of the initial Pioneer ACOs have separate
individuals for this responsibility. Id. CMS will take an active role in comparing the
“experience and health of beneficiaries who are aligned to an ACO in the Pioneer
ACO Model against comparable beneficiaries not aligned to an ACO.” Id. CMS will
actively supervise through service utilization analysis, and investigation of “suspect
trends” through “beneficiary surveys, audits, and other means.” Id.; see also Pioneer
Request, supra note 40. Additionally, CMS will hold each Pioneer ACO publicly
accountable by posting on its website a public record of each ACO’s quality results,
including the results from the patient experience metrics. Id.
194
Hirschman, supra note 13, at 272.
195
Id.
196
Id. at preface (ed.’s note).
193
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Both the MSSP and the commercial market permit patients to
197
exit the ACO.
Medicare beneficiary assignment in the MSSP
determines the population of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries
for whose care the ACO is accountable and determines whether an
198
ACO has achieved savings under the program. The MSSP final rule
deliberately permits Medicare beneficiaries to exercise free choice in
199
determining where to receive health care services.
The MSSP further restricts ACO participants from providing
incentives to beneficiaries to stay within the ACO, and restricts the
200
ability of ACO providers to refer to one another.
Specifically, the
MSSP rules prohibit ACOs and ACO participants from providing gifts
or other financial incentives to beneficiaries as inducements for
201
receiving items or services from, or remaining in, an ACO.
The
rules restrict the ability of MSSP participants to refer beneficiaries to
202
other providers and suppliers within the ACO.
Medicare
beneficiaries assigned to the ACO are free to express their
preferences for certain providers and the MSSP rules allow employees
or contractors of the MSSP participant to make such referrals in
203
response to such beneficiary preferences.
The freedom to leave an ACO, coupled with the prohibition
against referrals and financial incentives to entice beneficiaries to
remain in the ACO, is arguably a response to the managed care
backlash from the 1990s. Under the current accountable care
framework, if ACO patients are disappointed with their experience
within the ACO, they may leave, or, in the case of an employer-based
204
plan, they may lobby their employer to switch health care providers.
Exit is a very real concern for organizations that invest significant

197

MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67811.
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67983 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.400(b)).
199
Id.
200
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67981 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.304(a)(1))
201
Id. ACOs, however, may provide in-kind items or services to beneficiaries if
there is a reasonable connection between the items and services and the medical
care of the beneficiary and the items or services are preventive care items or services
or advance a clinical goal for the beneficiary. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67981 (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.304(a)(2)).
202
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67981 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.304(c)(2)).
203
Id.
204
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67956–57.
198
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resources into keeping populations healthy.
For example,
managed care organizations in the 1990s became critical of health
206
The criticism stemmed
promotion and disease prevention efforts.
from the assumption that the financial payoffs would not occur until
“many decades in the future” and would likely “produce their
primary benefits in savings for other health plans or for Medicare, if
207
prevention leads to healthier seniors.”
Research regarding employee wellness programs has also
208
explored the importance of exit to wellness program success.
Specifically, “worksite health promotion programs” are more effective
209
According to Kenneth Warner, “the
with a “captive audience.”
‘captive’ nature of the [workforce] is an essential feature of effective
210
health promotion.” The less employee turnover, the more effective
the health promotion program; whereas high employee turnover, or
“exit,” undermines the effectiveness of health promotion efforts and
211
thereby reduces the potential cost savings.
As a result,
organizations that invest in improving patient care through
prevention and overall wellness must be cognizant of the potential
for exit and, to the extent possible, design a program to address it.
2.

Success through Building Trust

The three broad categories of patient-centered criteria
regarding patient involvement in ACO governance, patient
engagement processes, and quality measures in the MSSP, strike at
building and maintaining patient loyalty or trust. Under the
212
Hirschman theory, building “loyalty” can minimize “exit.”
205

Kenneth E. Warner, Wellness at the Worksite, 9 HEALTH AFF. 63, 65 (1990).
Schlesinger, supra note 106, at 34.
207
Id.; see also Sheila Leatherman et al., The Business Case for Quality: Case Studies
and an Analysis, 22 HEALTH AFF. 17, 27 (2003) (noting that managed care
organizations that implement prevention efforts such as “smoking-cessation
programs, diabetes care management and risk reduction” likely encounter delayed
costs savings because of enrollee turnover).
208
Warner, supra note 205.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
See generally Hirshman, supra note 13. Americans, however, may be reluctant
to provide absolute loyalty; e.g., Hirshman notes that “[t]he traditional American
idea of success confirms the hold which exit has had on the national imagination.”
Id. at 274. Relevantly, he believes that “the ideology of exit has been [so] powerful in
America” that “the national disbelief in the economist’s notion that a market
dominated by two or three giant firms departs substantially from the ideal
competitive model.” Id. The ability to “transfer [one’s] allegiance from . . . firm A
206
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According to one researcher, patient trust differs from patient
satisfaction in that “satisfaction refers to the patient’s opinions of the
213
physician’s actions” that have already occurred, while trust on the
other hand, “looks forward” to the future “relationship between the
physician and patient” and “is based largely on perceptions about the
214
physician’s motivations.”
Satisfaction tends to be more objective;
215
trust may be more emotional.
Patients have described trust as a
216
Thus,
reflection of a commitment to an ongoing relationship.
building trust reaches deeper into the relationship between the
217
provider and patient and creates loyalty.
Because of the potential for patient exit, building and
maintaining trust between ACOs and their patients will be vital to
ACO success. Trust can help avoid the financial pitfalls experienced
by managed care organizations and employee wellness programs by
218
encouraging the patients to remain in the ACO.
Research on
patient trust has shown that, compared to patient satisfaction, trust is
more strongly associated with treatment adherence and continuity of
219
enrollment than patient satisfaction.
The MSSP offers ideas on how to build patient trust. For
example, the patient engagement processes require ACOs to
communicate “clinical knowledge” and “evidence-based medicine to
220
beneficiaries in a way that is understandable to them.”
It also
requires “[b]eneficiary engagement and shared decision-making that
takes into account the beneficiaries’ unique needs, preferences,
221
values, and priorities.”
The MSSP requires ACOs to coordinate
patient care by developing “individualized care program[s] . . . “to
222
promote improved outcomes for . . . patients.”
This emphasis on
individualized care and understandable communication is essential
to . . . firm B” suffices to satisfy the symbolic for exit. Id.
213
David H. Thorn et al., Measuring Patients’ Trust in Physicians When Assessing
Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF.124, 127 (2004).
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67967.
219
Thorn, supra note 213.
220
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§425.112(b)(2)(iv)).
221
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§425.112(b)(2)(v)).
222
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§425.112(b)(4)(ii)).
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to building trust. These criteria force ACOs to begin a dialogue with
patients about their care. This dialogue can expand to address the
cost effectiveness of the patient’s care, which can calm fears of
223
rationing.
According to one researcher, patients might be less
critical of financial incentives once they understand the dilemmas
associated with rising costs, evidence of widespread overuse of health
care services, and the challenges of changing physician behavior
224
using nonfinancial incentives.
Undertaking such a dialogue may
also help develop innovative cost-control strategies that generate less
patient concern about potential conflicts of interest that ACO
participants might have with regard to shared savings and other
225
financial incentives.
Moreover, meaningful patient dialogue creates true partnerships
226
in health care, which can translate to better health outcomes.
Indeed, a recent article highlighted the effectiveness of the
Collaborative Chronic Care Network (CCCN), which engages
chronically ill patients by having them “experiment with new
treatments and closely monitor[s] how the regimens affect[] them
227
day to day.” The patients “feed the data into [an] online network
228
through computers or smartphones for doctors to examine.” Most
significantly, the CCCN focuses on patient-centered care and allows
229
each patient to drive the experimentation. According to one of the
physician participants in the network, getting “the best outcomes”
230
requires parents and patients to be true partners.
3.

Success through Voice

Creating a dialogue with patients would also give voice to
patients, which would serve as an antidote to “exit” and achieve
another MSSP patient-centered requirement of meaningful patient
231
involvement in the ACO.
This dialogue can be accomplished
223

Gallagher, supra note 115, at 190–91.
Id.
225
Id. at 191.
226
Amy Dockser Marcus, Patients as Partners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304692804577281463879153408
.html.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id. The network also provides patients with an opportunity for “social
support,” allowing them to “find[] other patients who share[] similar interests or
live[] near them.” Id.
230
Id.
231
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67976 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
224
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through the MSSP patient experience of care surveys and patient
232
The MSSP requires ACOs to
representation in ACO governance.
233
survey its Medicare patients annually. Thus, at least once each year
MSSP Medicare beneficiaries will have the opportunity to voice their
concerns about their ACO experience. The patient experience of
care surveys should distinguish between more superficial satisfaction
questions, align with the ACO’s trust-building goal, and convey a
deeper concern for the patient’s overall health.
The MSSP quality of care measures that relate to patientcaregiver experience reinforce the importance of the patient care
234
surveys. These measures require MSSP participants to give patients
voice with regard to the timeliness of their care, appointments and
information, the effectiveness of physician communication, their
access to specialists, their experience with the ACO health promotion
and education efforts, their experience with shared decision making,
235
and their overall health status and functional status.
These
measures offer a wealth of information about the ACO’s effectiveness
in creating an appealing patient experience. By learning from
patients about their overall experience with the ACO and improving
the experience based on what is learned, the ACO has a better
chance of retaining patients and gaining new ones because of a
236
positive community reputation.
Meaningful participation in ACO governance—for example,
through representation on the ACO governing board—can also give
237
a voice to patients.
Patient representation on boards is related to
238
the interest group representation theory of the 1950s and 1960s.
The underlying theory of interest group representation states that
there are different groups with competing interests, and the voices of
the underrepresented must be inserted into the process so that good
425.106(c)(5)).
232
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67976–77 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.106(c)(2), 425.112(b)(2)(i)).
233
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67984 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.500(d)).
234
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67981, 67984 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§425.308(e); §425.500).
235
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67889.
236
Blendon, supra note 99, at 89 (“Health care consumers are much more likely
to rely on personal experiences or the recommendation of friends and family
members” when choosing health plans.).
237
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67976-77 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.106(c)(2)).
238
Trubek, supra note 120.

ZABAWA ET AL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1502

10/22/2012 2:27 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1471

239

public policy can be constructed. The hope is that, by including a
patient or beneficiary in the board, discussion will lead to fair
240
decisions.
One can see the effectiveness of voice from the MSSP
rulemaking process. The participation of REAP in the rulemaking
process for the MSSP rules demonstrates the importance of external
241
policy advocacy. REAP is an alliance for participation in health care
242
It is based on the National Patient
governance and regulation.
243
Advocate Program, a national active patient advocacy group.
Notably, REAP often supports the comments of the providers and is
244
rarely adversarial to many of the physician complaints. The alliance
of disease-based non-profits, such as the American Cancer Society,
245
wrote extensive comments on the proposed rules. The MSSP Final
Rule reflects many of the changes proposed by the patient groups as
246
well as the providers.
Meaningful participation in ACO governance is especially
important in light of the current lack of such participation, even in
highly integrated, high quality health care systems. Representatives
of the Wisconsin systems expressed a need for patients to have “more
247
skin in the game,” but none of those systems involved independent
248
The Wisconsin systems
patients in the system’s governance.
recognized that in the new world of value-based reimbursement,
249
patients would not be entitled to every type of treatment available.
For example, Dr. Samitt declared that in the new model, “patients
250
To
need to be willing to forgo procedures that don’t work.”
prevent the backlash experienced from the managed care movement,
239

Id.
The effectiveness of consumers on regulatory boards has been questioned. Id.
241
Comment from Regulatory Education and Action for Patients (REAP) to
Donald Berwick, Administrator, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2010-0259-0425 (last visited
Oct. 5, 2012) [hereinafter REAP Comment] (in reference to CMS-1345-P: Medicare
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations).
242
REGULATORY EDUC. & ACTION FOR PATIENTS, http://www.reapforum.org/about
(last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
243
See REGULATORY EDUC. & ACTION FOR PATIENTS, supra note 242.
244
See REAP Comment, supra note 241.
245
See id.; see also REGULATORY EDUC. & ACTION FOR PATIENTS, supra note 242.
246
See generally MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011).
247
Samitt Interview, supra note 53; Jaffery Interview, supra note 51.
248
Samitt Interview, supra note 53; Jaffery Interview, supra note 51.
249
Samitt Interview, supra note 53.
250
Id.
240
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however, it will be important for these systems to do more than just
instruct patients to be more responsible. These systems must engage
patients in meaningful dialogue, including involving patients in ACO
governance who are not otherwise affiliated with the ACO through
employment or family, for example. Such actions will help build the
trust needed for ACOs to succeed.
4. Success through Community Partnerships and Care
Coordination
Care coordination with other healthcare stakeholders is another
patient engagement process that can engender trust, not only with
individual patients, but with entire communities. Specifically, the
MSSP rules require participants to partner with community
251
stakeholders to improve the health of the community’s population.
The rules also require participants to coordinate care across the
spectrum of providers throughout an episode of care and during its
transitions, such as discharge from a hospital or transfer of care from
a primary care physician to a specialist (both inside and outside the
252
ACO).
Creating partnerships with community stakeholders outside the
ACO, such as public health agencies, families, workplaces, spiritual
leaders, and mental health providers, will facilitate an ACO’s ability
to move away from the current fragmented system and focus on the
patient’s overall well-being, not just the patient’s health condition.
Partnerships compel participants to view health as part of an
integrated whole. ACOs can accomplish such partnerships through
counseling programs, where trained counselors meet with patients
and ask patients questions about their quality of life and how their
253
health impacts that quality. For example, Women Breathe Free is a
program in which “nurse health educators provide regular telephone
counseling for patients, talking to them about their particular asthma
concerns, such as problems related to household cleaning or laundry
products and the use of” certain medications that “can exacerbate

251

MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67977 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. § 425.112(b)(2)(iii)(A)).
252
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
452.112(b)(4)).
253
See, e.g., Laura Landro, The Simple Idea That Is Transforming Health Care, WALL
ST.
J.,
Apr.
16,
2012,
at
R1,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304450004577275911370551798
.html.
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254

problems.”
Patients in the program “reported higher levels of
asthma-related quality of life and a greater reduction in the use of
255
certain medications.” Participants also missed fewer “days of school
256
and work”.
Partnerships with mental health providers will also be a critical
part of coordinating care to improve health outcomes and reduce
costs. According to the report of one Wisconsin health care
organization, “when behavioral health services are appropriately
integrated with medical services, better patient outcomes and cost
257
reductions of 20 to 30 percent are possible.”
For example,
Intermountain Healthcare found that by treating depressed patients
using a mental health integration care model, the average per-patient
allowed charges increased less than patients whose depression went
258
unaddressed.
In addition, integrating behavioral health with
primary care clinics improves the ability to coordinate care, improves
patient engagement in behavioral health care, and enhances overall
259
patient experience.
By taking responsibility for the whole patient, ACOs can
minimize the perception of market abuses and cherry-picking of
260
healthy enrollees that tainted the managed care movement. Rather
than pushing conditions that traditionally fell outside the medical
model, such as substance abuse or mental illness, onto other
254

Id.
Id.
256
Id.
257
William Henricks, Behavioral Health Integration: The Right Prescription for
Healthcare, ROGERS PARTNERS IN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH UPDATE (Mar. 2012) (on file with
the author) (citing N. Cummings et al., The Financial Dimension of Integrated
Behavioral/Primary Care, in UNDERSTANDING THE BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE CRISIS
(Cummings & O’Donohue, eds., 2011).
258
Henricks, supra note 257 (citing B. Reiss-Brennan, Cost and Quality Impact of
Intermountain’s Mental Health Integration Program, 55 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 1, 1–18
(2010)).
259
Henricks, supra note 257 (citing S. Bartles, Improving Access to Geriatric Mental
Health Services: A Randomized Trial Comparing Treatment Engagement with Integrated versus
Enhanced Referral Care for Depression, Anxiety, and At-Risk Alcohol Use, 161 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1455, 1455–62 (2004)); see also Jean M. Cassidy et al., Behavioral Healthcare
Integration in Obstetrics & Gynecology, MEDSCAPE GENERAL MEDICINE (May 15, 2003),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14603140 (emphasizing the need
for the inclusion and integration of services that identify, treat and medically manage
behavioral health issues in the practice of obstetrics and gynecology).
260
Schlesinger, supra note 106, at 32–33 (citing D. R. GERSTEIN & H. J. HARWOOD,
TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS (1990) (stating that managed care organizations failed to
treat substance abuse, leaving the costs to “fall on employers, family members or the
criminal justice system”)).
255
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community stakeholders such as employers, families, and the
criminal justice system, ACOs can partner with these stakeholders to
261
Community stakeholders that see a
help treat the whole person.
sincere interest in improving population health, as the MSSP rules
require, are less likely to criticize large collaborations of health care
providers.
Moreover, larger collaborations of providers and
community partners may be more effective in improving population
health, lending legal justification for certain mergers and joint
ventures. This approach is similar to the FTC’s approach to “clinical
integration” programs that improve quality and reduce costs through
262
interdependent and cooperative multi-provider collaborations.
Legitimate clinical integration is likely to survive antitrust scrutiny
263
from the FTC.
For true collaborative care to occur and succeed, patients, along
with employers and insurers, must be part of the equation and be just
264
as willing to sacrifice and change the status quo.
For example,
employers can encourage healthy activities such as smoking cessation
265
programs and exercise.
In Wisconsin, many insurers offer partial
rebates on health activities, such as participation in exercise
266
programs and community-supported agriculture shares programs.
The concept of patient responsibility and engagement was not part of
the managed care movement in the 1990s, but it must be part of the
267
current ACO movement if it is to succeed. Consumer engagement
is at the front end of ACO development rather than a response to
managed care with the Patient Bill of Rights.
B. The MSSP Legal Roadmap to Reduce Abusive Practices
The MSSP provides a legal framework in which participating
organizations can operate. In part, this legal framework addresses
261

Schlesinger, supra note 106, at 32–33.
J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed.Trade Comm’n, Clinical Integration in
Antitrust: Prospects for the Future, Remarks at the Am. Bar Assoc. 2007 Antitrust in
Healthcare
Conference,
7
(Sept.
17,
2007),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch.shtm.
263
Id. at 8–10 (citing two F.T.C. Advisory Opinion Letters regarding MedSouth
and Suburban Health Organization); see also Rosch, supra note 101.
264
Samitt Interview, supra note 53; Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52.
265
Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52.
266
For example, in Wisconsin, local HMOs provide partial rebates to subscribers
for purchasing Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) shares. See, e.g., FAIRSHARE
CSA COALITION, http://www.csacoalition.org/our-work/csa-insurance-rebate/ (last
visited Oct. 5, 2012).
267
Sanders Interview, supra note 54.
262
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the abusive market practice fears expressed by Greaney. Softening
the usual legal restrictions concerning health care organization
collaboration provides additional incentives for health care
organizations to adopt the MSSP concept, which DHHS will monitor,
268
as opposed to operating in the commercial ACO world only.
For
example, MSSP participants receive certain waivers of the physician
self-referral law and the federal anti-kickback statute, including
waivers for ACO participation, shared savings distributions,
compliance with the Physician Self-Referral Law, and patient
269
incentives.
Additionally, MSSP participants are afforded some
protection against antitrust concerns, in order to allow
270
collaboration.
With regard to anti-trust concerns, such as those raised by
Greaney, the FTC and the DOJ provided guidance for ACOs that are
eligible and intend to, or have been approved to, operate in the
271
MSSP. The guidance is also useful for ACOs that intend to operate
272
in the commercial market. The guidance states that an ACO will be
evaluated by the antitrust agencies under the “rule of reason
analysis,” which evaluates “whether the collaboration is likely to have
anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the collaboration’s
potential for procompetitive efficiencies are likely to outweigh those
273
effects.” The guidance creates an antitrust safety zone for ACOs in
274
the MSSP. Specifically, independent ACO participants that provide
a common service must have a combined share of thirty percent or
less of each common service in each participant’s primary service
area, wherever two or more ACO participants provide that service to
275
patients from that primary service area. ACOs that “exceed the 30
268

MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67840 (Nov. 2, 2011); Fed. Trade
Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice, Final Policy Statement: Statement of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026-32 (Oct. 28, 2011)
[hereinafter Antitrust Enforcement Policy].
269
Interim Final Rule: Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67992-01 (Nov. 2, 2011).
270
See Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id. at 67027.
274
Id. at 67026.
275
Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67031. Calculating the primary
service area (PSA) for an ACO is complex. For each participant in an ACO, and
each service provided by that participant, a “primary service area (PSA)” is defined as
“the lowest number of postal zip codes from which the ACO participant draws at least
75 percent of its patients.” Id. The ACO has a share in the PSA of a participant
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percent primary service area share may still fall within the safety zone
276
ACOs with a dominant
if [they qualify] for a ‘rural exception.’”
participant—for example, with a greater than fifty percent share in its
277
primary service area—may also fall within the safety zone.
These
ACOs are granted access to the safety zone only if: (1) there are no
other ACO participants that provide the common service in that
primary service area; and (2) the dominant participant does not
require private payers to contract exclusively with the ACO or
otherwise restrict private payers’ ability to contract or deal with other
278
provider networks or ACOs.
This relaxed standard of review is being accorded to ACOs in the
MSSP and Pioneer programs because the antitrust agencies view the
MSSP rules as generally consistent with clinical and financial
279
integration efforts that they have approved in the past.
For
example, the FTC and DOJ have approved of physician or multiprovider joint ventures that share substantial financial risk for the
280
purpose of achieving overall efficiency for the venture.
The
agencies have also approved joint ventures that “implement an active
and ongoing program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the
venture’s providers and [that] create a high degree of
interdependence and cooperation among the providers to control
281
costs and ensure quality.” The agencies consider organizations that
meet MSSP requirements to be “reasonably likely to be bona fide
arrangements intended to improve the quality, and reduce the costs,
of providing medical and other health care services through their
282
participants’ joint efforts.”
Thus, closely following the MSSP
requirements, like the patient-centered criteria, may help ACOs
outside the MSSP avoid scrutiny by the FTC and DOJ.
The legal waivers and safety zones, however, do not provide carte
blanche protection against antitrust issues. ACOs under both MSSP
when that participant provides services for the ACO. Id.
276
Id. at 67029. The “rural exception” applies when the “physician’s or physician
group practice’s primary office is in a zip code that is classified as ‘isolated rural’ or
‘other small rural.’” Id.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Rosch, supra note 101, at 4 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, at Statement 8
(1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/policy/index
.htm).
280
Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026–27.
281
Id.
282
Id.
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and Pioneer must still take care to avoid garnering more than fifty
283
percent of the market share in a specific primary service area.
Moreover, regardless of an ACO’s primary service area shares or
other indicia of market power, ACOs should avoid improper
exchanges of prices or other competitively sensitive information
284
among competing participants.
They should also avoid: (1)
preventing or discouraging private payers from directing or
incentivizing patients to choose certain providers through antisteering, anti-tiering, guaranteed inclusion, most-favored-nation, or
similar contractual clauses or provisions; (2) tying sales of the ACO’s
services to the private payer’s purchase of other services from
providers outside the ACO (and vice versa); (3) contracting on an
exclusive basis with ACO physicians, hospitals, ambulatory surgery
centers or other providers, thereby preventing or discouraging those
providers from contracting with private payers outside the ACO; and
(4) restricting a private payer’s ability to make available to its health
plan enrollees cost, quality, efficiency, and performance information
to aid enrollees in evaluating and selecting providers in the health
plan, if that information is similar to the cost, quality, efficiency, and
285
performance measures used in the MSSP. In essence, regardless of
MSSP participation, all ACOs may minimize the chance of legal
challenges by adopting MSSP elements and goals, particularly the
MSSP’s patient-centered criteria.
C. The MSSP Can Help “Spread” Accountable Care Using Multitier
Governance
The MSSP framework is multi-tier—local organizations placed in
a national framework. MSSP created a national framework to
encourage the formation of coordinated, collaborative local health
care delivery. The framework allows for variation in the ACOs so that
they can respond to and respect local conditions. The variation in
the local organizations allows for learning across the ACOs regionally
and nationally.
1.

The National Framework

The MSSP program provides the national government with
283

See Pioneer Request, supra note 40 (stating an understanding that the Antitrust
Policy Statement designed for MSSP ACOs would also apply to Pioneer ACOs); see
also 76 Fed. Reg. 67026–27.
284
76 Fed. Reg. 67026–28.
285
Id. at 67030.
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leverage to bring up lagging states and health care providers to join
in the accountable care movement. This ability to pull up “laggards”
is important for states and providers taking the lead on transitioning
286
to a value-based payment system. For example, about sixty percent
of Wisconsin providers have been cooperating in self-monitoring
287
practices through the WHCQ. This cooperation helps to minimize
the need for governmental mandates. Yet many Wisconsin practices,
particularly small practices and specialty clinics, consider cooperative
self-monitoring to be a low priority, and have no “business reason to
288
do this absent a mandate.” The refusal of “stragglers” to participate
289
As a result, some
creates an unfair and uneven marketplace.
Wisconsin healthcare industry stakeholders believe that government
290
intervention is necessary.
For example, when collecting provider
quality data, some health care providers refuse to submit data to the
291
According to one health care leader, such unequal
repository.
commitment to measuring quality may require “legislative action to
292
assure that all providers are reporting.”
The need to “scale up” can be seen in the national framework—
it includes incentives and tools to encourage value care and flexibility
for local conditions. The hope of shared savings provides a financial
293
incentive.
Other tools encourage improving value—use of
electronic records, metrics, stakeholder participation, and
294
The framework also reduces the barriers to the
benchmarks.
formation of ACOs such as anti-trust concerns and potential fraud
295
and abuse violations.
The MSSP rule continues fee-for-service,
286

See, e.g., Tanja A. Borzel, Why there is no ‘Southern Problem’: On Environmental
Leaders and Laggards in the European Union, 7 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 141, 147–49, 158–60
(2000), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/135017600343313 (discussing how
“domestic mobilization by social actors” can “pull” the “laggard” states to comply with
European Union policy).
287
Queram Interview, supra note 76.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Toussaint, supra note 49; Queram Interview, supra note 76.
292
Toussaint, supra note 49, at e88.
293
MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. 67802, 67985–87 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. §§ 425.600–04).
294
MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67975–76, 67984–85 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§§ 425.106, 425.500, 425.506, 425.602).
295
See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes:
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1304–05 (May 2012) (describing methods that lawmakers use to
“induce, facilitate, and monitor contextualizing regimes”).
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296

makes the program voluntary, and allows choice of physicians. This
framework encourages the slow movers to consider the move to value297
based care.
The MSSP provides a national method to encourage those who
298
are not “early movers” by leveraging Medicare.
Medicare is
essential because it is a national program, in contrast to Medicaid,
which is controlled at the state level. Part of this acceleration process
is occurring in specific ways. For example, the CMS Innovation
Center has created the “Advance Payment ACO Model,” to which
certain organizations can apply to receive advance payments to
299
establish an ACO. CMS created this program partly in response to
300
comments regarding the proposed MSSP rule. This model removes
funding barriers for certain organizations to enter into the ACO
301
The MSSP also allows fee-for-service billing to continue.
arena.
Both of these provisions encourage health care providers to make the
move to coordinated care while preserving some aspects of the
302
traditional volume-based model. CMS is also driving the linking of
patient satisfaction to provider compensation—surveys, report cards,
303
and the creation of well-validated quality metrics. Finally, the MSSP
“safety zone” provides a legal basis that can be used to align with
304
commercial programs.
296

MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67975 (to be codified as 42 C.F.R. § 425.100).
Jaffery Interview, supra note 51.
298
Id.
299
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ADVANCE PAYMENT ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATION MODEL FACT SHEET,
(Oct.
20,
2011),
available
at
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Advance-Payment-Model-ACO-FactSheet.pdf [hereinafter ADVANCE PAYMENT ACO FACT SHEET].
300
Id.
301
Id.
302
Note that certain providers may not participate in the MSSP, at least initially.
MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §425.114(a)).
Under section § 425.114(a), participation in the Shared Savings Program is not
permitted if one of the ACO participants “participates in the independence at home
medical practice pilot program under section 1866E of the Act, a model tested or
expanded under section 1115A of the Act that involves shared savings, or any other
Medicare initiative that involves shared savings” such as the PGP, or the Pioneer ACO
model. Id. Yet the models are fluid, and participants in one may subsequently switch
to the other. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PIONEER/MEDICARE
SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM APPLICATION CROSSWALK http://www.cms.gov/Medicare
/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/Crosswalk
_Instructions-Pioneer_Applicants.pdf (last viewed Oct. 6, 2012).
303
MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67976 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.112).
304
MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67840–44, 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
425.202).
297
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The ACA has carefully carved out a space for the ACO amid the
existing regulations for health care organizations at the federal and
state levels. Like other related provisions within the ACA, the MSSP
concept of ACOs builds on ideas that have already succeeded in a
variety of pilot and experimental programs. Some projects that have
provided proof of concept for components of the MSSP ACO
305
include: Physician Group Practice (PGP), Medicaid Section 115
306
307
Waiver, Section 1315 Waiver, Medicare Disproportionate Share
308
309
Hospital Scheme, and Medicare Health Care Quality.
The national framework allows for ongoing monitoring and
feedback. The enthusiasm for ACOs is largely based on their
310
perceived ability to reduce costs and provide improved care.
The
expansion to a national scale makes oversight and shared learning
essential. In the difficult conversion to ACOs, there is likely to be
confusion and backsliding. The ACO rules do provide for auditing
and feedback, and careful attention to these oversight functions is
essential.
2.

Diffusing the ACO Model

New Jersey’s adoption of accountable care models after other
states exemplifies discursive diffusion. Discursive diffusion theory
suggests that various processes, including financial incentives, public
discussion of waste and excessive costs, and evidence of
geographically based poor outcomes, subtly transform national
311
discourse and thus local organizations. Diffusion is encouraged by
the national frameworks that create the incentives to allow moving
312
healthcare organizations to view the new concepts as practical.
Discursive diffusion allows leaders to diffuse their models to laggards
through these various mechanisms. For example, when reports are
305

See Benefits Improvement and Protection Act, § 412, Pub. L. No. 106-554
(2000).
306
See Social Security Act,§ 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006); see also Waivers,
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/03
_Research&DemonstrationProjects-Section1115.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
307
See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006).
308
See §§ 1395–1395ii.
309
Medicare Health Care Quality (MHCQ), 42 U.S.C. § 1866C(b), added by
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) §
646 (Pub. L. 108-173), and amended by ACA §3021(c) (2010).
310
For a cautionary paper, see generally Mantel, supra note 148.
311
David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of
Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination, 11 EUR. L. J. 343, 357 (2005).
312
Id.
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written in terms set by new models of care, new concepts with
definitions of reality embedded in them come to be accepted at all
313
The role of consultants who widely advertise and indicate
levels.
their ability to transform an existing organization into an ACO
contributes to the diffusion, especially with the availability of websites
314
and electronic information.
The Brookings-Dartmouth ACO
315
Learning Network Services is one example.
It offers webinars,
implementation work groups, member-driven conferences, and
316
online tools and resources. The MSSP encourages extensive use of
317
metrics and benchmarks.
When healthcare providers see their
performance benchmarked against others and against guidelines,
“they must confront new policy paradigms and take on broad new
318
concepts and vocabularies.”
A number of the Wisconsin health care organizations expressed
a desire to serve as leaders in the ACO movement and therefore set
the benchmarks that others should follow. For example, George
Kerwin, Chief Executive Officer of Bellin, stated that he hopes to
share Bellin’s experience as a Pioneer ACO with other entities not
319
part of the pioneer system.
Dean expressed having aspirations of
320
national leadership. Marshfield Clinic noted that it would rather be
in control of implementing solutions to health care problems rather
321
than responding to ultimatums. Interestingly, this desire to lead is
occurring despite the assumption that organizations that already
operate in an efficient, high-quality manner will likely lose money in
322
the short-term.
It is through leadership like that aspired to by
313

Id.
See, e.g., The Brookings-Dartmouth Partnership, DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH
POLICY & CLINICAL PRACTICE, http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/health
/about-us/collaborations (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
315
Id.
316
Id.
317
MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. 67802, 67976 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. § 425.112).
318
Trubek & Trubek, supra note 311.
319
Kerwin Presentation, supra note 58.
320
Samitt Interview, supra note 53.
321
Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52; see also Toussaint, supra note 49
(noting that Wisconsin’s implementation of health care quality measures and
information sharing among Wisconsin providers and insurers has been voluntary and
consensus driven but that at some point, it may be necessary for legislative action to
assure that all providers comply with reporting expectations).
322
Thompson Presentation, supra note 58 (noting that Gundersen’s care
coordination program is not compatible in the current payment system and causes
Gundersen to lose approximately $10 million in charges each year that the system
314
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Wisconsin health care organizations that will help diffuse best
practices in the ACO model.
3.

Learning Across ACOs

In addition to the vertical interaction between the local ACOs
and the MSSP national framework, interaction between the ACOs
and the community at the local level, and between ACOs around the
country, are important dimensions. The flexibility and variety among
323
the local ACOs permits and requires learning across regions.
The
multi-tier structure was pioneered in the disease-management
324
programs, and promoted in the community health centers. These
programs rely on regional communication across clinics to share data
and successes and failures. These horizontal networks contribute to
325
the success of the programs.
V. ADOPTION OF THE MSSP AND OTHER ACO MODELS POST-ACA
Since the passage of the ACA, the rapid adoption of ACO
models is notable. Wisconsin and New Jersey, the two states that are
part of this study, demonstrate this rapid adoption. All the Wisconsin
providers examined for this paper expressed a belief that they were
providing accountable care before the ACA created a statutory
mandate for the MSSP. Although take-up of the MSSP among
Wisconsin providers has been quite diverse, the MSSP has appeared
to fuel the already-existing interest in the ACO concept. Dean
Health System was selected along with Bellin to participate as a
“Pioneer ACO,” but only Bellin decided to move forward with that
326
option.
Bellin’s Chief Executive Officer stated that Bellin moved
forward with the Pioneer ACO model for several reasons: (1) it had
been participating in the Medicare Advantage program, which has a
similar capitated reimbursement model to the Pioneer ACO model;
(2) the Medicare fee-for-service population consisted of twenty-seven
could have otherwise billed).
323
See Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Health Care Governance in
Transition, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 395, 412 (2003).
324
Id.
325
Id.
326
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEET ON THE PIONEER
ACCOUNTABLE
CARE
MODEL
(Dec.
19,
2011),
available
at
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Pioneer-ACO-General-Fact-Sheet.pdf
(listing Bellin Thedacare Healthcare Partners as one of thirty-two Pioneer ACOs).
Allina Health, a Minnesota health care system that serves Minnesota and Western
Wisconsin, is also one of the thirty-two Pioneer ACOs, but is not discussed in this
Article because it is based in Minnesota. Id.
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percent of Bellin’s total population, which is a significant enough
number to make a difference, but not so significant that it would
cause Bellin to collapse if the Pioneer ACO model fails to work; and
(3) to better compete in the crowded Northeast Wisconsin healthcare
327
provider market.
Dean decided to pursue the two-sided risk ACO model instead of
the Pioneer ACO model in part because it was not servicing Medicare
Advantage patients and therefore would not be ready to launch a
capitated model with Medicare patients by January 1, 2012, the start
328
of the first Pioneer ACO performance period. Dean fully intends,
329
however, to become a Pioneer ACO at some point in the future.
Marshfield Clinic opted to continue its participation in the Medicare
Physician Group Practice (PGP) demonstration, in which it was one
of two physician groups who experienced shared savings in each year
330
of the five-year demonstration period.
The other eight physician
331
groups did not experience shared savings in all five years. Finally,
although the Monroe Clinic is excited about the concept of
accountable care, it has decided to take the “wait and see” approach
with regard to adopting any accountable care model, either within
332
the MSSP or outside of it.
In New Jersey, the MSSP is contributing to increased attention to
collaborative, coordinated care.
The prominent example of
accountable care development in New Jersey is the New Jersey-based
333
legislation for Medicaid ACOs.
A reformist physician in Camden,
327

Kerwin Presentation, supra note 58 (noting that the approximately one
million people living in Northeast Wisconsin can choose from Aurora, Affinity,
Prevea/St. Vincent and St. Mary’s, as well as Bellin).
328
Dr. Craig Samitt, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Dean Health System,
Presentation at ACO Innovators Symposium (Feb. 22, 2012).
329
Id.
330
Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., BROCHURE ON MEDICARE PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION 4 (July
2011), available at https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/PGP
_Fact_Sheet.pdf [hereinafter PGP FACT SHEET].
331
Id. at 4–6.
332
The March 2012 opening of a new building received priority over other plans
to align physician compensation with global reimbursement initiatives. Sanders
Interview, supra note 54.
333
Legislative findings and declarations; accountable care organization (ACO)
models as a tool to improve health care, N.J.S.A. § 30:4D-8.1 (2011); John V. Jacobi,
Presentation at the Seton Hall Law Review ACO Symposium: Implementing the
Affordable Care Act: What Role for Accountable Care Organizations? (Oct. 28,
2011), available at http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/11/02/livestreampodcast-seton-hall-law-review-aco-symposium/; Jeffrey Brenner, Founder and
Executive Director of the Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers, Presentation at
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New Jersey, in cooperation with local hospitals, developed a program
334
to serve high-cost, low-income patients through innovative tools. A
law professor, public interest lawyer, and physicians formed a group
to enact statewide legislation to encourage this type of organization
335
that they also termed an accountable care organization.
Though
significantly different from the MSSP model, the legislation, with the
aid of business support, provides a framework for developing other
336
community-based ACOs in New Jersey. This legislation encourages
337
a community organizing approach. While the incentives to develop
the New Jersey Medicaid ACO are based on the low reimbursement
rates for Medicaid and the substantial inequality in health care,
338
calling it an “ACO” helped the legislation to pass.
The use of the
ACO name also contributes to a more general acceleration of the
339
transformation of health care organizations throughout the state.
The commercial sector is demonstrating interest. The Blue
Cross Blue Shield plan in New Jersey is participating in an acquisition
of a communication network in order to “transform the delivery of
340
health care in our country.”
The Chief Executive Officer of the
information technology company Lumeris stated that “[t]his
innovative cloud-based solution will be fundamental to the success of
341
payer-led accountable care initiatives nationwide.”
Another
initiative is the increasing formation of multispecialty practices. One
the Seton Hall Law Review ACO Symposium: Implementing the Affordable Care Act:
What Role for Accountable Care Organizations? (Oct. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/11/02/livestream-podcast-seton-hall-lawreview-aco-symposium [hereinafter Brenner Presentation].
334
Gawande, supra note 134.
335
Renee Steinhagen, John V. Jacobi, & Jeffrey Brenner, Presentations at the
Seton Hall Law Review ACO Symposium: Implementing the Affordable Care Act:
What Role for Accountable Care Organizations? (Oct. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/11/02/livestream-podcast-seton-hall-lawreview-aco-symposium/.
336
Joel C. Cantor, Opinion: A Tale of Two ACOs, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/12/0206/1910/.
337
Brenner Presentation, supra note 335.
338
Cantor, supra note 336.
339
See id.; see generally Elizabeth G. Litten, ACOs: Getting More for Less, 204 N.J.L.J.
522 (2011).
340
Blue Plans and Lumeris Complete Acquisition of Nation’s Largest Real-Time Health
(Mar.
14,
2012),
Care
Communications
Network,
MARKETWATCH
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/blue-plans-and-lumeris-complete-acquisition-ofnations-largest-real-time-health-care-communication-network-2012-03-14
(quoting
Daniel J. Hilferty, President and Chief Executive Officer of Independence Blue
Cross).
341
Id.
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article describing the initiation of these practices in New Jersey stated
that “[s]uch group practices are being formed across the country as
the government and health-insurance industry shift to paying for care
342
based on the value of service rather than the volume of services.”
Nationwide, by the end of 2011, nearly one hundred health care
organizations were developing contracts with private health plans
based on an accountable care model, which included tying payment
to improving patient care across the continuum and reducing overall
343
spending growth.
VI. LOOKING AHEAD: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The transformative change to value-based care is underway, led
by MSSP and joined by private payers. As the movement picks up
steam, one challenge is whether governance through the national
framework, horizontal sharing by ACOs, and patient-centeredness
will be sufficient to move value-based care forward. The MSSP
national framework may not supply adequate monitoring and
344
measuring oversight.
For example, it is not clear how the MSSP
framework as currently designed will provide oversight for private
345
The rules do not provide tools or guidance to encourage
payers.
sharing of knowledge and resources. There is no encouragement for
horizontal linkages in the MSSP rules. In their filing with CMS, the
REAP group noted the absence in the rules of encouragement for
346
regional and statewide horizontal links. The patient-centered goal
has real limits in how it is framed. There are no requirements for
347
The group
participation in community planning for healthcare.
representation of patient interests is placed exclusively in the patient
348
representative on the ACO governing board.
Another challenge is the integration of ACOs into broader
health care policy. As ACOs create their own internal organization,
342

Post, supra note 89.
Elliott S. Fisher et al., Building the Path to Accountable Care, 365 NEW ENGL. J.
MED. 2445, 2445 (2011).
344
Elliot Fisher & Stephen Shortell, ACOs: Making Sure We Learn From Experience,
FUND
BLOG
(Apr.
12,
2012),
COMMONWEALTH
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Blog/2012/Apr/ACOs-Making-Sure-We-Learnfrom-Experience.aspx.
345
Id.
346
REAP Comment, supra note 242.
347
See 76 Fed. Reg. at 67802-21; Brenner Presentation, supra note 338.
348
MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67976 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. §425.106(c)(2)).
343

ZABAWA ET AL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

ADOPTING ACCOUNTABLE CARE

10/22/2012 2:27 PM

1517

will they make sure to integrate into broader medical, geographic,
and patient networks? External networks that monitor stakeholder
349
involvement are important. Some networks form to work on policy.
350
Others form to work on participation in delivery of services. These
351
These groups can
networks can operate bottom-up or top-down.
provide support for the embedding and developing of effective
patient engagement at all levels, from the local ACOs to the national
framework. Three examples of the value of such external advocacy
352
are: (1) patient participation in managed care in Wisconsin, (2)
353
community organizing in New Jersey, and (3) REAP in the ACO
354
In Wisconsin, the patient participation occurred in
rules debate.
355
the initial passage of legislation encouraging MCO development.
After the national backlash against managed care organizations,
356
Patients’ Bills of Rights were promoted.
In Wisconsin, some
physicians and patient groups united to work on the Wisconsin
357
version.
While separate ACOs are competing in the market,
collaborative efforts to maintain and improve the model, such as the
Wisconsin example, are essential. These external local collaborations
of physicians, community providers, and patient groups can provide
training for patient representatives, provide information on
community needs, and link to ACOs in other locations.
External stakeholders such as the National Committee for
Quality Assurance, national patient advocacy groups, and major
ACOs can develop a network that can facilitate learning across the
ACOs.
Fisher and Shortell suggest such groups can gather
information on successes and failures in contract design,
organizational capabilities, impact on patients, and impact on

349

See, e.g., Elliott Fisher, Research, The Dartmouth Inst. for Health Pol’y &
Clinical Res., Geisel School of Med. at Dartmouth, available at
http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/initiatives/accountable-care-organizations/research.
350
See,
e.g.,
iPhysicianHub
&
ACO
Services,
iPHYSICIANHUB,
http://iphysicianhub.com/HubContent/PhysicianHubAndACOServices.aspx (last
visited Oct. 5, 2012).
351
See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 311.
352
See supra section II.B.1 and notes 49 and 76.
353
See supra section II.B.2 and notes 91 and 94.
354
See REGULATORY EDUCATION & ACTION FOR PATIENTS, supra note 242.
355
Louise G. Trubek, Making Managed Competition a Social Arena: Strategies for
Action, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 275, 298 (1994).; Queram Interview, supra note 76.
356
Patient Rights and Resolution of Patient Grievances, WIS. ADMIN. CODE D.H.S.
§§ 94.01–94.54 (2010) (providing for administrative regulation of patient rights in
Wisconsin).
357
Trubek, supra note 120, 591–92.
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358

community-level heath and costs. These groups can do this, in part,
by monitoring how well the private and public payers are producing
359
However, Fisher and
the data and making the data transparent.
Shortell admit that there are major challenges to track performance
at both the ACO level and the community level: “Without
community-level aggregation, we will be hard pressed to know
whether the new payment model is having an impact on what
matters: the quality of affordability of care and the health of our
360
communities.”
VII. CONCLUSION
The MSSP is not a panacea for all of the nation’s ills in health
care delivery and payment, but it holds much promise for achieving
the goals of better health, better care, and lower costs. It is evident
that the MSSP has incorporated lessons learned from the managed
care and consumerism movements, particularly with including
patient-centered criteria so that patients are engaged in ACO
development and operation at the outset. The MSSP patientcentered criteria can serve as a model for all ACOs that wish to attain
patient buy-in and ultimately, the full financial benefit of a valuebased payment health care system. The MSSP also furnishes a
framework for the ACO movement to spread across providers who
can learn from one another, set new standards, and unify the
fragmented system around providing all patients with high quality
care at lower costs.

358
359
360

Fisher & Shortell, supra note 344.
Id.
Id.

